University of California, Hastings College of the Law

UC Hastings Scholarship Repository
Faculty Scholarship
2020

Reliance on Executive Constitutional Interpretation
Zachary S. Price
UC Hastings College of the Law, pricez@uchastings.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/faculty_scholarship

Recommended Citation
Zachary S. Price, Reliance on Executive Constitutional Interpretation, 100 B.U. L. Rev. 197 (2020).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/faculty_scholarship/1819

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of UC Hastings Scholarship
Repository. For more information, please contact wangangela@uchastings.edu.

RELIANCE ON EXECUTIVE
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
ZACHARY S. PRICE*

ABSTRACT

Federal executive officials routinely authorize government personnel to
violate otherwise applicable laws based on contestable constitutional
interpretations.This practice raises an important and unresolvedquestion, one
that arose in connection with the George W. Bush Administration's
interrogationpractices and that could easily arise again: What legal effect, if
any, should internal executive guidance on constitutional questions have in
subsequent civil or criminallitigation againstofficials who relied on it?
This Article systematically analyzes this question. Building on existing case
law in related areas, it argues that any soundreliance defense in this area must
balance three competing constitutionalconsiderations:(1) a fairnessprinciple,
reflecting the intuitive unfairnessofpenalizing officials who reliedin goodfaith
on internally authoritative legal guidance; (2) an antisuspending principle,
reflecting separation-of-powerslimitations on the executive branch's authority
to eliminate or disregard applicable statutory constraints; and (3) a
departmentalism principle, reflecting the longstanding assumption that the
executive branch holds at least some authority to interpret the Constitution
independently from courts in performing executive functions. Contrary to past
accounts, which have tended to argue categorically against or in favor of a
general reliance defense, properly balancing these competing considerations
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shouldyield a set of calibrateddefenses that vary accordingto the nature of the
executive determination and the characterof the litigation.
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INTRODUCTION

Following the controversial selection of a Central Intelligence Agency
("CIA") Director who previously worked on aggressive counterterrorism

operations, the CIA's use of "enhanced interrogation" during the George W.
Bush Administration was recently back in the news. 1 Despite renewed soulsearching over past abuses, however, a key legal question presented by this
program-whether executive-branch legal opinions approving it immunized

participants against future liability-remains unanswered.
Although the government has announced no plan to resume such interrogation
methods, numerous other controversial activities-from overseas drone strikes
and electronic surveillance to ethics arrangements and spending for diplomacy,
national security, border security, or law enforcement in violation of
appropriations restraints-might well depend on internal legal opinions
concluding, as the Justice Department's Office of Legal Counsel ("OLC") did
with respect to enhanced interrogation,

that civil

or criminal

statutory

prohibitions are inapplicable for constitutional reasons. 2 Indeed, amid a recent
weeks-long shutdown of certain agencies due to an appropriations lapse, the
Trump Administration apparently sought ways to keep government functions

running, 3 notwithstanding a criminal statute that prohibits obligating funds
without a supporting appropriation. 4 As with enhanced interrogation in the Bush
years, government personnel or others acting in reliance on internal legal

guidance or presidential directives in any of these areas might commit crimes,
civil violations, or torts if the guidance they followed turns out to be mistaken.
If the basic legal issue regarding reliance on executive constitutional
interpretation has not gone away, the political context in which it operates has
changed significantly. Though it was polarized enough in the Bush years,
American politics since then has only grown more brutal and partisan. This trend
increases the chances that future controversies will not be resolved through
informal means, such as the prosecutorial forbearance applied to exempt Bush

Shane Harris & Karoun Demirjian, Senate Confirms Haspel to Be First Female CIA
Head, WASH. PosT, May 18, 2018, at A01 ("The Senate voted Thursday to confirm Gina
Haspel as the next CIA director after several Democrats were persuaded to support her despite
lingering concerns about the role she played in the brutal interrogation of suspected terrorists
captured after 9/11.").
2 See infra Section I.A.
s See, e.g., Dep't of the Interior-Activities at National Parks During the Fiscal Year 2019

Lapse in Appropriations, B-330776, 2019 WL 4200991, at *1 (Comp. Gen. Sept. 5, 2019)
(finding that Department of Interior illegally obligated funds during shutdown to maintain
certain services at national parks).

4 31 U.S.C. §§ 1341-1342, 1350 (2018). For my observations at the time of the shutdown,
see Zachary Price, The ConstitutionalLaw of Shutdowns, TAKE CARE BLOG (Jan. 8, 2019),
https://takecareblog.com/blog/the-constitutional-law-of-shutdowns [https://perma.cc/H9ZEBMBF] (observing that, due to current partisan animosity, "[s]hutdowns may become a
political weapon" and "[t]he executive may then be tempted to get around funding restraints
through aggressive theories of executive power").
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Administration interrogators from sanction. 5 Next time, key constituencies may

well demand heads on spikes, leaving it to courts to sort out whether past
reliance affords any current legal defense. Courts would then confront the
question: Is the executive-branch lawyer's power to advise ever also a power to
immunize?

This Article articulates a legal framework for resolving this question. In hopes
of providing guidance ahead of the next crisis (and perhaps forestalling it
altogether), the Article aims to address the problem outside the heat of any
immediate

controversy

while nonetheless

using real-world

examples as

illustrations. As I will explain, case law has recognized reliance defenses, based
on due process in the penal context and qualified immunity in the civil tort
context, that are potentially available to government officials or others who
relied on internal guidance to take actions later deemed unlawful. 6 Yet past
accounts

7
or
these defenses as either categorically available
8
unavailable in the federal context are mistaken. Reliance

viewing

categorically
questions in this area instead implicate a paradox that defies easy resolution:
while protecting reliance may encourage executive officials to seek legal advice,
by the same token it may create incentives to corrupt the advice-giving process

to ensure desired outcomes. Squaring this circle requires taking account of three
complex and largely incommensurate
constitutional underpinnings.

structural

principles,

each

with

The first and most intuitive of these principles relates to fairness. All else
being equal, providing official assurance that planned actions are lawful renders
it grossly unfair to turn around and hold those who undertook such actions
accountable for lawbreaking. The second principle, which conflicts with the
first, is what I call an "antisuspending" principle. One basic constitutional

limitation on federal executive authority is that executive officials may not hold
unchecked authority to eliminate (or "suspend") governing legal requirements.
Any reliance doctrine in this context must take account of this principle too. The
third principle, which is unique to the particular problem addressed here, is a
departmentalism

principle.

Under longstanding

constitutional

theory and

practice, each branch of the federal government holds some authority to interpret
5 For discussion and critique of the Obama Administration's forbearance from
interrogation-related prosecutions, see DAVID LUBAN, TORTURE, POWER, AND LAW 275-76
(2014).
6 See infra Section I.B.
7 See, e.g., Daniel L. Pines, Are Even TorturersImmune from Suit? How Attorney General
Opinions Shield Government Employees from Civil Litigation and CriminalProsecution,43
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 93, 97 (2008) (purporting to "demonstrate that, in virtually every
situation, government employees who rely on an Attorney General opinion in taking action
will likely be absolved from any legal sanction").
8 See, e.g., David Kurtz, Mark This Day, TALKING POINTS MEMO (Feb. 7, 2008, 12:24 PM),
https://talkingpointsmemo.com/edblog/mark-this-day [https://perma.cc/AA6X-8YW9]
(condemning Justice Department's refusal to investigate OLC-approved waterboarding and
wiretapping during the Bush Administration). See generally JACK GOLDSMITH, POWER AND
CONSTRAINT: THE ACCOUNTABLE PRESIDENCY AFTER 9/11, at 234 (2012) (describing civil
rights advocates' push for prosecution of interrogators despite OLC opinions).
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the Constitution for itself in performing its central constitutional functions. In at
least some instances, this principle might support protecting individuals'
reliance on an internally authoritative executive-branch view even if courts, as a
distinct branch of government, would have reached a different legal conclusion
de novo.
Reconciling these three principles, this Article contends, should yield three
basic doctrinal rules:
(1) Reliance on a signed OLC or Attorney General opinion should
provide a due process defense in any subsequent civil or criminal
government enforcement action, but only insofar as the opinion's
conclusions were objectively reasonable.
(2) Reliance on any other executive directive, including presidential
signing statements and legal determinations reached through interagency
dialogue, should support such a defense only insofar as the legal
conclusions at issue either accorded closely with past OLC or Attorney
General opinions or were objectively correct in the reviewing court's view.
(3) In other litigation contexts, including private damages suits against

federal officers, reliance on executive-branch legal conclusions should
provide no particular defense.

These ground rules adapt existing reliance case law to the background
constitutional principles that are necessarily implicated in this context. My
proposal, furthermore, draws strength from governing principles in other related
areas. Under the familiar Chevron and Mead doctrines from administrative law,
maximum judicial deference to executive legal determinations often depends on
both the institutional identity of the interpreter (i.e., whether it is interpreting a

statute it administers) and the degree of process the interpreter followed (i.e.,
whether it employed notice-and-comment procedures). 9 Here, by rough analogy,
the degree of after-the-fact judicial deference, in the form of reliance protection
for potential defendants, should track whether the executive decision-making
process was both institutionally and procedurally designed to give maximum
force to legal values. At the same time, to preserve overall judicial primacy in
constitutional interpretation, courts should retain authority to formulate
independent legal conclusions in at least some litigation contexts.
My argument here for these conclusions is essentially doctrinal. I aim to

sketch the path forward that, by aligning "justification" and "fit" in conventional
Dworkinian fashion, best adapts existing case law to relevant structural
considerations and normative values that should shape its further elaboration.10

9 See, e.g., United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 228-30 (2001) (outlining
circumstances under which agency interpretations of governing statutes receive judicial
deference).
10 See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 255 (1986) (advocating that judges "decide hard
cases by trying to find, in some coherent set of principles about people's rights and duties, the
best constructive interpretation of the political structure and legal doctrine of their
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Apart from its practical utility, however, my analysis contributes to some
important theoretical debates. As a function of partisan polarization and the deep
substantive disagreements animating American politics, legal and constitutional
interpretation appears to be growing more fractious, with different institutional

actors-federal executive agencies, courts, members of Congress, states, and
commentators-vying to shape public perception of legal issues. At the same

time, some recent scholarship suggests that the federal executive branch's own
decision-making is growing more "porous," with multiple rivalrous actors vying

internally with OLC and the Attorney General to shape ultimate legal
positions. I
The analysis offered here provides a concrete case study of how our legal

system might accommodate these pressures without abandoning basic rule-oflaw commitments. If legal decision-making is indeed becoming both more
rivalrous and more flexible, we may well need to think about executive
constitutionalism with Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.'s "bad man" in mind,12
focusing not so much on what outcomes would be ideal in any single instance
as on what remedial understandings may best preserve institutional structures
and constrain tactical behavior in the long run.1 3
community"); Ronald Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARV. L. REv. 1057, 1096-98 (1975)
(discussing methods of an ideal judge). The approach I employ here, which I take to be the
conventional approach to precedent in the American legal system, employs Dworkin's basic
method of seeking an attractive normative justification that fits existing legal authorities but
eschews the overt goal of moral advancement that Dworkin embraced and instead seeks a
justification more squarely rooted in the legal materials themselves. Cf Thomas Merrill,
Interpretingan Unamendable Text, 71 VAND. L. REv. 547, 592 & n.179 (2018) (characterizing
this approach to precedent as "Burkean").
" See Daphna Renan, The Law PresidentsMake, 103 VA. L. REv. 805, 848-78 (2017); see
also Robert F. Bauer, The National Security Lawyer, in Crisis: When the "Best View" of the
Law May Not Be the Best View, 31 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 175, 259 (2018) (arguing that
executive-branch lawyers, including OLC, should aim to provide "reasonable" guidance
rather than the "best view" of law in national security crises).
2 Oliver W. Holmes, Jr., Justice, Mass. Supreme Judicial Court, Address at Boston
University School of Law: The Path of the Law (Jan. 8, 1897), in 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 461
(1897) (discussing "bad man's" conception of legality based primarily on consequences).
" I do not address here the question whether executive-branch lawyers themselves should
be subject to discipline or civil liability for flawed constitutional advice. Such sanctions or
liability could serve to maintain appropriate professional standards for executive-branch
lawyers but would not vindicate the primary conduct prohibitions that lawyers advised
government officials or others to disregard. For analysis of lawyers' potential liability, see,
for example, HAROLD H. BRUFF, BAD ADVICE: BUSH'S LAWYERS IN THE WAR ON TERROR 294-

95 (2009) (advocating for ethical discipline for lawyers involved in torture controversy); Peter
M. Shane, Executive Branch Self-Policing in Times of Crisis: The Challenges for
ConscientiousLegal Analysis, 5 J. NAT'L SECURITY L. & PoL'Y 507, 520 (2012) ("There are
strong reasons for the public to insist on higher standards, both to guide government attorneys
in the future, and to assure a commitment to democracy, constitutional government, and the
rule of law."); Mark Stepper, Note, A Government Lawyer's Liability Under Bivens, 20
CORNELL J.L. & POL'Y 441, 466-67 (2010) (addressing potential civil liability for government
lawyers).
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My argument proceeds as follows. Part I highlights the range of contexts in
which reliance on executive constitutional interpretation may come into play. It
also offers a brief overview of existing scholarship and its shortcomings. Part II
turns to normative analysis of reliance on federal executive constitutional
interpretation. It begins by addressing the nature of the due process inquiry.
Although some cases have recognized constitutional protection against the
unfairness of punishing individuals for conduct the government assured them
was lawful, any doctrine building on this case law must also take account of
structural values and limitations. Part II then identifies and describes the three
key principles-fairness, antisuspending, and departmentalism-that come into
play in this context. Part III articulates and defends a doctrinal framework that,
by properly balancing these key considerations, could mold existing doctrines
into forms suited to the institutional setting of federal executive-branch
constitutional interpretation. The Article closes with a brief conclusion
reflecting on this framework's relevance in navigating ongoing partisan and
intragovemmental conflicts over constitutional meaning.
I.

SKETCHING THE PROBLEM

To help ground the inquiry and provide examples for later analysis, I begin

here in Section L.A by sketching a variety of circumstances in which officials
may place reliance on executive constitutional interpretation. My examples are

illustrative rather than exhaustive; I aim simply to sketch the problem's contours.
Section I.B then briefly surveys existing scholarship on this reliance problem,
with a focus on identifying shortcomings in past accounts.
A.

Executive Interpretation'sMany Manifestations

The CIA's notorious use of waterboarding and other forms of "enhanced"
interrogation against terrorism suspects at Guantanamo Bay, the Abu Ghraib
prison, and other overseas locations during President George W. Bush's "War

on Terror" is a recent example of the problem under consideration here.
Although this example was particularly acute and troubling, however, the basic
problem of reliance on dubious executive-branch constitutional interpretation is
potentially extensive and arises across a variety of domains.
To start with the torture example, during the George W. Bush Administration,

CIA officials and other personnel engaged in coercive interrogation techniques
in reliance on certain OLC opinions known to history as the "Torture Memos."14

14 See generally Memorandum from Jay Bybee, Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legal
Counsel, for John Rizzo, Acting Gen. Counsel, Cent. Intelligence Agency, on Interrogation
of al Qaeda Operative (Aug. 1, 2002) [hereinafter Classified Bybee Memo],
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/legacy/2010/08/05/memo-bybee2002.pdf
[https://perma.cc/VH6H-9ML7] (deeming particular severe interrogation techniques lawful);
Memorandum from Jay Bybee, Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, for Alberto
R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, on Standards of Conduct for Interrogation Under 18

U.S.C.

§§ 2340-2340A (Aug.

1, 2002)

[hereinafter

Unclassified

Bybee Memo],

https://www.justice.gov/olc/file/886061/download [https://perma.cc/96FF-9ZPL]
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An Act of Congress in fact prohibited torture, defined in the relevant provision
as action "under the color of law specifically intended to inflict severe physical
or mental pain or suffering (other than pain or suffering incidental to lawful
sanctions) upon another person" in custody. 15 Nevertheless, OLC opinions
formulated in the pressured aftermath of the September 11, 2001, attacks not

only construed this prohibition narrowly but also concluded that applying any
such statute to punish interrogations ordered by the President for national
security reasons would violate the President's Article II constitutional
authorities. 16
OLC itself later withdrew these opinions as unsound; the next administration
actively considered legal action against officials who relied on them; and an
internal Justice Department ethics investigation concluded that the opinions

reflected "poor judgment" and "overstate[d] the certainty of [their]
conclusions." 17 In the ethics investigation, the Department ultimately deemed it
a "close question" whether the key lawyer involved "intentionally or recklessly
provided misleading advice to his client."18 It stopped short of finding
professional misconduct mainly because the positions advanced in the opinions
were sincerely held by their lead author. 19 As for criminal prosecution, although
the Obama Administration appointed a special prosecutor to investigate officials
(concluding that "only extreme acts" violate criminal prohibitions on torture); Memorandum
from John Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, for William J.
Haynes, II, Gen. Counsel, Dep't of Def., on Military Interrogation of Alien Unlawful
Combatants Held Outside the United States (Mar. 14, 2003) [hereinafter Yoo Memo],
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/legacy/2009/08/24/memo-combatantsoutside
unitedstates.pdf [https://perma.cc/XFH8-6MLB] (concluding that certain enhanced
interrogation practices were legal under both American and international law).
For discussion of the memos' background and later withdrawal, see Memorandum from
David Margolis, Assoc. Deputy Attorney Gen., Office of the Deputy Attorney Gen., for Eric
Holder, Attorney Gen., Office of the Attorney Gen., on Objections to the Findings of
Professional Misconduct in the Office of Professional Responsibility's Report of
Investigation into the Office of Legal Counsel's Memoranda Concerning Issues Relating to
the Central Intelligence Agency's Use of "Enhanced Interrogation Techniques" on Suspected
Terrorists (Jan. 5, 2010) [hereinafter Margolis Memo], https://fas.org/irp/agency/doj/oprmargolis.pdf [https://perma.cc/YJT7-EKSE].
15 18 U.S.C. § 2340(a), 2340A(a) (2018) (defining torture and criminalizing it in some
circumstances).
6 See Unclassified Bybee Memo, supra note 14, at 2 ("[I]n the circumstances of the
current war against al Qaeda and its allies, prosecution under Section 2340A may be barred
because enforcement of the statute would represent an unconstitutional infringement of the
President's authority to conduct war."); Yoo Memo, supra note 14, at 1 (stating that applying
criminal laws of general applicability under the circumstances "would conflict with the
Constitution's grant of the Commander in Chief power solely to the President").

17 See Margolis Memo, supra note 14, at 68.
'8 See id. at 67.
19 Id. ("I fear that John Yoo's loyalty to his own ideology and convictions clouded his view
of his obligation to his client and led him to author opinions that reflected his own extreme,
albeit sincerely held, views of executive power while speaking for an institutional client.").
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who exceeded the Justice Department's legal authorizations, President Obama
and Attorney General Eric Holder declined to pursue officials who acted in
accordance with authoritative OLC opinions. 20 At the same time, Congress
enacted legislation generally immunizing the officials in question from civil
liability. 2 1
Although this troubling chapter was thus resolved by political action without
any litigation over reliance defenses, the basic phenomenon it illustrates is
pervasive. Another salient recent opinion controversially rejected statutory and
constitutional objections to launching overseas drone strikes against American
citizens suspected of plotting terrorist attacks. 22 Other public OLC opinions in
recent years have interpreted the Free Exercise Clause to allow certain federal
loans in defiance of a statutory restriction, 23 authorized diplomatic activities in

20 See Eric H. Holder, Jr., Attorney Gen., Office of the Attorney Gen., Remarks Regarding

a Preliminary Review into the Interrogation of Certain Detainees (Aug. 24, 2009),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-eric-holder-regarding-preliminaryreview-interrogation-certain-detainees [https://perma.cc/7ZFB-F6JU] ("[T]he Department of
Justice will not prosecute anyone who acted in good faith and within the scope of the legal
guidance given by the Office of Legal Counsel regarding the interrogation of detainees."). For
general background on this decision, see GOLDSMITH, supra note 8, at 233-36.
21 Due to statutes enacted in 2005 and 2006, federal law now provides:
In any civil action or criminal prosecution against an officer, employee, member of the
Armed Forces, or other agent of the United States Government who is a United States
person, arising out of the officer, employee, member of the Armed Forces, or other
agent's engaging in specific operational practices, that involve detention and
interrogation of aliens who the President or his designees have determined are believed
to be engaged in or associated with international terrorist activity that poses a serious,
continuing threat to the United States, its interests, or its allies, and that were officially
authorized and determined to be lawful at the time that they were conducted, it shall be
a defense that such officer, employee, member of the Armed Forces, or other agent did
not know that the practices were unlawful and a person of ordinary sense and
understanding would not know the practices were unlawful. Good faith reliance on
advice of counsel should be an importantfactor, among others, to consider in assessing
whether a person of ordinarysense and understandingwould have known the practices
to be unlawful. Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit or extinguish any
defense or protection otherwise available to any person or entity from suit, civil or
criminal liability, or damages, or to provide immunity from prosecution for any criminal
offense by the proper authorities.

42 U.S.C. § 2000dd-1(a) (2018) (emphasis added).
22 Memorandum from David J. Barron, Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legal Counsel,
for Eric Holder, Attorney Gen., Office of the Attorney Gen., on Applicability of Federal
Criminal Laws and the Constitution to Contemplated Lethal Operations Against Shaykh
Anwar al-Aulagi (July 16, 2010) [hereinafter Drone Memo], https://lawfare.s3-us-west2.amazonaws.com/staging/s3fs-public/uploads/2014/06/6-23-14_Drone_Memo-Alone.pdf
[https://perma.cc/L4UF-657U] (approving drone strike targeting U.S. citizen overseas).
23 See Religious Restrictions on Capital Financing for Historically Black Colleges and

Universities, 43 Op. O.L.C., 2019 WL 4565486, at *1 (Aug. 15, 2019) [hereinafter OLC HBC
Memo].
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defiance of specific appropriations limitations, 24 approved an extensive military

campaign in Libya without congressional authorization, 25 and allowed a
controversial form of immigration relief for millions of undocumented
immigrants 26-all based on disputed theories of executive authority.
To the extent the legal and constitutional analysis underlying these actions is

flawed, officials carrying out these policies might well be violating applicable
statutory restraints. Drone strikes, for example, could conceivably violate
statutory prohibitions on murder and war crimes. 27 In addition, any spending in
support of unlawful actions could violate the Antideficiency Act ("ADA"), a
penal statute that bars any expenditure or obligation of federal funds without
specific congressional authority. 28 Indeed, in a controversial prisoner exchange

in 2014, the Obama Administration transferred prisoners held at the
Guantanamo Naval Base in open defiance of statutory limits on such transfers.
When the Government Accountability Office determined that this action

violated the ADA, the executive branch responded by asserting that the
appropriations limits should be read countertextually to avoid constitutional
concerns. 29 More generally, any commitment of funds amid increasingly
frequent government "shutdowns" due to lapses of annual appropriations could
violate the ADA if the legal or constitutional interpretations on which officials

relied were flawed.

24 See Constitutionality of Section 7054 of the Fiscal Year 2009 Foreign Appropriations

Act, 33 Op. O.L.C., 2009 WL 2810454, at *1 (June 1, 2009) [hereinafter OLC 2009
Appropriations Memo].
25 See Authority to Use Military Force in Libya, 35 Op. O.L.C., 2011 WL 1459998, at *1
(Apr. 1, 2011) [hereinafter OLC Libya Memo].
26 See The Department of Homeland Security's Authority to Prioritize Removal of Certain
Aliens Unlawfully Present in the United States and to Defer Removal of Others, 38 Op.
O.L.C., 2014 WL 10788677, at *1-2 (Nov. 19, 2014) [hereinafter OLC Immigration Memo].
27 See generally Drone Memo, supranote 22, at 12-35 (addressing and rejecting potential
application of various statutes to drone strike against U.S. citizen).
28

31 U.S.C. §§ 1341-1342, 1350 (2018) (outlining limits on obligation of funds and

penalties for violations). The ADA includes a criminal provision for "knowing[] and willful[]"
violations. Id. § 1350. Insofar as willfulness requires consciousness of wrongdoing, reliance
on an OLC opinion should normally prevent criminal liability under this provision so long as
the official in question had no reason to know the legal opinion was flawed. Other
administrative sanctions under the statute, however, do not require this mens rea. See, e.g., id.
§ 1349(a) (providing for "appropriate administrative discipline including, when
circumstances warrant, suspension from duty without pay or removal from office"). In such
cases, therefore, only a due process reliance defense could bar liability. In addition,
government officials may sometimes be personally responsible for unlawful expenditures. See
id. § 3528 (rendering certain officials liable for overpayments they authorized).
29 See Dep't of Def.-Compliance with Statutory Notification Requirement, B-326013,
2014 WL 4100408, at *1 (Comp. Gen. Aug. 21, 2014) (concluding that Department of
Defense violated an appropriations restriction, and thus the ADA, by transferring detainees
from Guantanamo Bay to Qatar).
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In another form of executive constitutional interpretation, Presidents routinely
issue signing statements and other directives claiming authority to defy various
putatively unconstitutional provisions in particular bills. 3 0 In President Trump's

first signing statement, for example, he asserted constitutional authority to defy
statutory appropriations restrictions

on activities as varied as diplomacy,

military detention, military command control, and marijuana enforcement. 31
Recent accounts of executive-branch legalism, furthermore, have highlighted
alternative mechanisms for formulating executive legal positions that may
circumvent OLC and the Attorney General altogether, even on important
constitutional questions. 32 During the Obama Administration, according to some
accounts, important national security questions were apparently often resolved
by a "Lawyers Group" composed of multiple agency lawyers, without
necessarily seeking any formal legal guidance from OLC. 33 In another

noteworthy example, President Obama adopted the view expressed in testimony
from the State Department Legal Adviser, rather than OLC, to justify continuing
a bombing campaign in Libya beyond the sixty-day limit in the War Powers

Resolution. 34 These examples illustrate how executive officials may take
multiple paths to formulating highly consequential internal constitutional
judgments.
B.

Existing Scholarship and Its Limitations

Reliance on executive constitutional interpretation, then, is widespread.
Federal executive officials going about their business may be required, in some
cases on pain of termination or other penalties, to rely on constitutional
determinations by other officials within their own government. To date, the
political system has generally protected such officials from later civil or criminal

&

3' For general discussion of signing statements and their value, see Curtis A. Bradley
Eric A. Posner, PresidentialSigning Statements and Executive Power, 23 CONST. COMMENT.
307, 312-16 (2006).
31 Presidential Statement on Signing the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017, 2017
DAILY COMP. PRES. Doc. 312 (May 5, 2017) [hereinafter Trump 2017 Appropriations Act
Signing Statement], https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/DCPD-201700312/pdf/DCPD-

201700312.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZB45-ZW4V].
32 See, e.g., Renan, supranote 11, at 837-40 (positing that national security legal decisionmaking within executive branch has grown more informal and diffuse).

33

CHARLIE SAVAGE, POWER WARS: INSIDE OBAMA'S POST-9/11 PRESIDENCY 64 (2015)

(describing interagency national security lawyers group as "elite council of the top lawyers
from each of the core national security-foreign policy agencies"); Renan, supra note 11, at
837 (describing group as consisting of "leadership from the legal offices of the key national
security agencies, as well as the head of OLC and the legal advisor to the National Security
Council inside the White House").

31 See Trevor W. Morrison, Libya, "Hostilities," the Office of Legal Counsel, and the
Process of Executive Branch Legal Interpretation, 124 HARv. L. REV. F. 62, 62 n.2 (2011)
(discussing Obama Administration's legal position).
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penalties based on their reliance. 35 Yet such forbearance could easily fall prey
in the future to the country's fraying political cohesion. If such a reversal occurs,
the question for courts in the resulting litigation will be whether and to what
degree past reliance on executive constitutional views should provide a legal
defense as a matter of due process.
Although courts have never yet grappled adequately with this problem, a

number of commentators have addressed it. Their accounts have tended,
however, to overreach in one direction or another. Some commentators have
advocated a near-complete defense based on a trilogy of cases 36 in which the
Supreme Court protected private parties' reliance on government assurances of

legality regarding conduct that was in fact criminal. 37 But while these cases may
support arguments for protecting

official

reliance on

government legal

3

opinions, 8 understanding them to establish a blanket defense both misreads the
cases and shortchanges important structural considerations that must factor into
the analysis. 39 Simply put, a government official's reliance on the government's

own self-authorizing legal opinions raises concerns that are absent when the only
issue is the governmental bait-and-switch of mistakenly assuring some private
party that particular planned conduct was lawful.

Others have argued that officials who relied on authoritative legal guidance
should at least hold a defense of qualified immunity against civil tort liability.40

3 Cf GOLDSMITH, supra note 8, at 233-36 (describing decision of President Obama and
Attorney General not to pursue officials who acted in accordance with OLC opinions).
3

United States v. Penn. Indus. Chem. Corp. (PICCO),411 U.S. 655, 675 (1973) (holding

that appellant should have been allowed to "present evidence in support of its claim that it
had been affirmatively misled" about legality of its actions by Army Corps of Engineers);
Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 571 (1965) (holding that conviction for illegal picketing near
courthouse violated Due Process Clause because police officials previously assured appellant
his demonstration was not "near" courthouse); Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423, 426 (1959)
(holding that three appellants' convictions violated Due Process Clause because Ohio
convicted them "for exercising a privilege which the State had clearly told [them] was

available").
37 For commentary advocating a reliance defense, see, for example, Pines, supra note 7, at
97-98; Martin S. Lederman, A Dissenting View on Prosecuting the Waterboarders,
BALKINIZATION

(Feb. 8, 2008, 3:33 AM), https://balkin.blogspot.com/2008/02/dissenting-

view-on-prosecuting.html [https://perma.cc/J2KV-Q97F] (suggesting that cases stand for
"broad proposition that criminal culpability may not be imposed for conduct undertaken in
reasonable reliance upon the representation of government officials that the conduct was
lawful").
38

See infra Section III.A.

39 Cf Lederman, supra note 37 (noting potential exception "ifthe OLC memos on torture,

and the subsequent CIA General Counsel directives, were so patently wrong that any
reasonable CIA operative or contractor should have been aware of that fact").
4

See Edward C. Dawson, Qualified Immunity for Officers' Reasonable Reliance on

Lawyers' Advice, 110 Nw. U. L. REV. 525, 557 (2016) (advocating for immunity based on
reliance on legal opinions generally); Pines, supra note 7, at 122-31 (advocating for immunity
based on reliance on guidance from Attorney General).
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Qualified immunity is itself controversial, 41 but even holding aside questions
about its validity, this immunity arose to address a quite different problem from
executive constitutional self-authorization. By protecting government officials
from liability unless the legal principles they violated were "clearly established"
by prior case law, 42 qualified immunity addresses the unfairness and potential
chilling effects of holding individual officers personally liable for actions that
they could not anticipate courts would consider unlawful. By contrast, the key
problem here is self-authorizing governmental interpretation that allows conduct
a court would not.
Yet another account has pointed to law-of-war limits on the "Nuremberg
defense" of following superior orders as a model for any defense of OLC
reliance. 43 But this defense is also a poor fit for the problem of reliance on
executive constitutional guidance. Under the modern understanding, soldiers are
normally entitled to presume their orders are lawful; the "superior orders"
defense gives way only if under the circumstances the order in question was "so

manifestly unlawful that no reasonable combatant would have misperceived [its]
criminality."44 The defense thus serves principally to encourage law-of-war
instruction and compliance with certain basic rules that largely accord with
ordinary moral intuitions. 45 It is not obvious what comparably intuitive standard

nonlawyers (or even many lawyers) could apply in assessing whether an asserted
interpretation of Article II's vague and open-ended provisions adequately

justifies disregarding a statutory prohibition.
At the opposite extreme, some commentators have suggested that no reliance

defense should be available at all, at least when the conduct in question is
criminal. 46 Yet this view carries the opposite defect: it ignores the cases just
noted that recognize at least some protection for reliance as a matter of due

4' See, e.g., William Baude, Is QualifiedImmunity Unlawful?, 106 CALIF. L. REv. 45, 45
(2018) (arguing that "qualified immunity doctrine is unlawful and inconsistent with
conventional principles of statutory interpretation").
42

Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (holding that "government officials

performing discretionary functions, generally are shielded from liability for civil damages
insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights
of which a reasonable person would have known").
4s See Mark W.S. Hobel, Note, "So Vast an Area of Legal Irresponsibility"?The Superior
Orders Defense and Good Faith Reliance on Advice of Counsel, 111 COLUM. L. REv. 574,

575 (2011).
44 See id. at 591.
4s See id.
46 See, e.g.,

HUMAN

RIGHTS WATCH,

GETTING AWAY

WITH TORTURE: THE BUSH

ADMINISTRATION AND MISTREATMENT OF DETAINEES 8 (2011), https://www.hrw.org/sites

/default/files/reports/us071lwebwcover.pdf [https://perma.cc/EP6F-8MB7] ("While US
officials who act in good faith reliance upon official statements of the law generally have a
defense under US law against criminal prosecution, this does not mean that the Justice
Department should embrace the sweeping view that all officials responsible for methods of
torture explicitly contemplated under OLC memoranda are protected from criminal
investigation."). See generally GOLDSMITH, supra note 8, at 234 (describing civil rights
advocates' push for prosecution of interrogators despite OLC opinions).
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process and likewise overlooks ways in which reliance protection could advance
rule-of-law values by encouraging officials to seek legal guidance.
Past commentary on the reliance problem has thus fallen short. As noted,
however, the question could easily cease to be academic. The increasingly
fractious and contested character of legal interpretation in our polarized
Republic may make it more likely that future administrations and litigants will
seek sanctions against officials who relied on past constitutional guidance. For
example, if the Trump Administration engages in torture or some comparable

statutory abuse-or indeed if it undertakes spending, law enforcement, or
military

action

in violation of applicable

statutory restraints-a

future

Democratic administration might face considerable pressure to prosecute
without regard to any internal legal opinions issued earlier. Members of that
administration, in turn, might face threats of prosecution from a succeeding
Republican administration for any violations of their own. Meanwhile, if federal
executive-branch legal decision-making is indeed growing more "porous" and
informal-that is, if legal determinations are increasingly the outputs of a
rivalrous interagency process that may facilitate cherry-picking of favorable

advice-then executive legal determinations might lose credibility with outside
observers, even though individual officials will almost inevitably place
considerable reliance on them.
Courts confronting any resulting litigation will face an important task of
doctrinal elaboration. In undertaking this effort, they should neither throw up
their hands and reject reliance arguments across the board nor shoehorn novel

reliance claims into existing doctrines developed for different purposes. The
effort instead requires navigating between fit and justification, in conventional
common-law fashion. More specifically, it requires accounting for existing legal
authorities and established practices while also identifying the relevant structural
and normative considerations that should shape those authorities' application in

the context at hand. The remainder of this Article elaborates how this analysis
should unfold.
II.

FRAMING THE INQUIRY

Crafting a reliance doctrine in this context requires extrapolating from

existing case law to develop a due process doctrine informed by relevant
structural considerations. Existing decisions already invite framing the analysis
in these terms: they call for a structurally informed theory of due process rather
than blanket protection (or nonprotection) for reliance on official assurances of
legality. In this context, at least three cross-cutting structural considerations
come into play: (1) a departmentalism principle supporting independent
elaboration of constitutional meaning by the executive branch, (2) an
antisuspending principle limiting executive authority to undo statutory
restraints, and (3) a fairness principle protecting government officials from
egregious entrapment for doing their jobs. After explaining in Section II.A how

the due process case law invites structural analysis, I sketch each of these three
considerations and their relevance in Section II.B.
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StructurallyInformed Due Process

Due process, as we have already seen, is at least plausibly implicated by the
governmental bait-and-switch of prosecuting officials or private parties for
conduct the government itself earlier indicated was lawful. 47 Under the modern
fairness-oriented conception of due process, the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments, as well as the federal Administrative Procedure Act's related
protection against "arbitrary and capricious" government action, often preclude

retroactive or unforeseeable liability. 48 Thus, for example, the Supreme Court
has invalidated vague criminal statutes, 49 required "fair warning" of
administrative constructions, 50 protected reliance on some past enforcement
policies that reflected an apparent interpretation of governing law, 5 1 and

generally adopted a robust presumption (though not an outright prohibition)
against retroactive liability for previously lawful conduct. 52 Most relevant here,
in three cases stretching from 1959 to 1973-Raley v. Ohio,53 Cox v.
Louisiana,54 and United States v. Pennsylvania Industrial Chemical Corp.

(PICCO)55-the Court held that, in some circumstances, due process precludes
subsequent punishment for conduct that government agents specifically invited
with assurances of legality.56
These decisions confirm the intuitive unfairness of holding government
officials to account for actions their superiors assured them were lawful and
directed them to undertake. If, as the Supreme Court has held, it would amount
to "the most indefensible sort of entrapment" to punish a witness for asserting a
4" See supra Section I.B.
48

See, e.g., Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 268 (1994) (adopting strong

presumption against retroactive application of statutes).
49 See, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2556-57 (2015) (finding Armed
Criminal Career Act's residual clause unconstitutionally vague for failing to give adequate
notice of conduct it punished).

50 See, e.g., FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 567 U.S. 239, 254, 258 (2012) (finding
that FCC violated due process when it changed its policy regarding indecency statute without
giving defendants adequate notice).

" See, e.g., Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156, 2169-70 (2016)
(refusing to defer to agency's current interpretation in part because agency appeared to follow
contrary view in past and regulated parties placed reliance on that understanding).
52 See, e.g., Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 268 (adopting presumption that statutes do not apply
retroactively); see also Epilepsy Found. of Ne. Ohio v. NLRB, 268 F.3d 1095, 1102-03 (D.C.
Cir. 2001) (discussing presumption against retroactive application of new regulations).

5 360 U.S. 423, 425-26 (1959) (holding that convicting defendant for "exercising a
privilege which the State had clearly told him was available to him" violated Due Process
Clause).
54 379 U.S. 559, 574 (1965) (noting that due process requires "laws and regulations to be
drawn so as to give citizens fair warning as to what is illegal").
5 411 U.S. 655, 674-75 (1973) (allowing defendant to produce evidence of reliance on
agency statements).
56 For my prior analysis of these cases, see Zachary S. Price, Reliance on Nonenforcement,

58 WM. &MARY L. REv. 937, 971-77 (2017).
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privilege that the regulatory body in question said was valid 57 or to prosecute
misconduct that applicable regulatory guidance deemed lawful at the time, 58
then it surely raises considerable fairness concerns to punish government
personnel for taking actions that their superiors assured them were lawful. Such
officials, after all, might also have faced sanctions or at least adverse career
repercussions had they not taken the actions in question.

Nevertheless, for reasons I have addressed at greater length elsewhere, 59 these
cases themselves invite consideration of more than just intuitive fairness.
Although the Supreme Court purported to establish a general balancing test in
the central modern due process case, Mathews v. Eldridge,60 structural
considerations suffuse the pattern of case outcomes, if not always the decisions'
explicit reasoning, in the reliance context. 61
For example, although the Supreme Court has understood due process to
support a robust presumption against retroactive legislation that disrupts
significant reliance interests, 62 the Court has generally limited this presumption
to so-called "primary" retroactivity, i.e., unanticipated legal liabilities resulting

from completed past conduct. The Court has declined to include "secondary"
retroactivity, i.e., disruption of an expected continuation of existing laws into
the future. 63 Such secondary reliance may be quite substantial and entirely
reasonable-as many business plans and private investments presume that
anticipated activities will remain legal and tax rates stable-but due process
cannot protect it because doing so would unduly infringe upon legislatures'
ongoing authority to alter existing substantive laws.64

Cases addressing reliance on executive assurances reflect similar structural
imperatives. In particular, although the Supreme Court's trilogy of anti-

entrapment cases-Raley, Cox, and PICCO-recognized that official assurances
of legality may sometimes bar future prosecution, lower courts have limited
these cases' application in two important ways: First, courts have restricted them

to circumstances in which government officials provide official assurance of
5 See Raley, 360 U.S. at 438.
58 See PICCO, 411 U.S. at 657.
59 See Price, supra note 56, at 944 (positing that "reliance defenses require balancing
separation of powers concerns against considerations of individual fair notice").
6 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (assessing whether procedures violated Due Process Clause by
weighing "(1) the private interest that will be affected by the official action; (2) the risk of an
erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if
any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and (3) the Government's interest").
61 Price, supra note 56, at 967.
62 See, e.g., Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 268 (1994) (holding that
retroactive legislation has potential for unfairness and is generally disfavored).
63 See, e.g., United States v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26, 33-34 (1994) (holding that, despite
plaintiff's reliance on continuity of tax law, "tax legislation is not a promise, and a taxpayer
has no vested right in the Internal Revenue Code").
" See id. ("An entirely prospective change in the law may disturb the relied-upon
expectations of individuals, but such a change would not be deemed therefore to be violative
of due process.").
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legality, as opposed to a mere promise of enforcement forbearance. 65 And

second, courts have restricted their application to circumstances in which
reliance is "reasonable in light of the identity of the [government] agent, the
point of law misrepresented, and the substance of the misrepresentation."66
Though ostensibly justified by fairness, both these limitations in fact reflect
structural concerns. Without fully understanding the lawyerly distinction
between enforcement and interpretation, nonlawyers may readily misjudge

whether they should reasonably rely on nonenforcement assurances as opposed
to assurances of legality. 67 By the same token, nonlawyers may easily misjudge
the reasonableness of assurances that the law permits particular conduct. 68 Yet
formally protecting reliance on either type of assurance might enable executive
officials to change the law without valid authority to do so; they could
effectively cancel substantive legal prohibitions by inviting reliance on mistaken

assurances. 69 Both these limitations thus serve to cabin reliance claims, even
though doing so risks causing considerable intuitive unfairness in individual
cases. 70

In sum, due process protections based on official assurances generally require
balancing fairness considerations against separation-of-powers principles, with

the scales tilted in most cases toward maintaining structural norms and the
continued enforceability of underlying substantive laws.7 1 The same balance is
implicated here, but it takes on additional dimensions when the form of legal
assurance at issue is a self-authorizing constitutional interpretation by the federal

executive branch. In this context, the balance implicates three conflicting and
largely incommensurate principles, each with constitutional underpinnings.

65 See, e.g., United States v. Bader, 678 F.3d 858, 886 (10th Cir. 2012) (citing United
States v. Apperson, 441 F.3d 1162, 1204-05 (10th Cir. 2006)) (requiring defendant to show

that government official actively misled defendant about the law); United States v. Hancock,

231 F.3d 557, 567 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing United States v. Tallmadge, 829 F.2d 767, 773 (9th
Cir. 1987)) (explaining that entrapment-by-estoppel defense only applies where "authorized
government official tells the defendant that certain conduct is legal and the defendant believes

the official").
* See, e.g., Bader, 678 F.3d at 886 (quoting Apperson, 441 F.3d at 1204-05).
67 See Price, supra note 56, at 981-82 (noting that, in the reliance-defense context, "[e]ven
quite egregious unfairness triggers no due process barrier to prosecution when separation of
powers concerns are acute").
68

See id. at 979.

For elaboration of this argument, see generally id.
70 See id. at 981-82.
71 See id (reviewing jurisprudence on reliance defenses).
69
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Three Relevant Principles

The Departmentalist Tradition of Executive Constitutionalism

1.

The first relevant principle falls under the heading of "departmentalism," the
theory that each branch of the federal government may interpret the Constitution
independently in performing its own functions. 72

Courts today play the preeminent role in interpreting and enforcing the
Constitution; the Supreme Court has even described this authority as exclusive. 73
Yet the other two branches of the federal government engage in constitutional
interpretation too. 74 In particular, as we have seen, the executive branch

routinely claims authority to disregard particular statutory provisions based on
its own independent judgment that such provisions are unconstitutional. To
repeat earlier examples, administrations of both parties routinely claim authority

to disregard limitations on conduct of diplomacy; the executive branch has
developed a controversial internal jurisprudence regarding use of military force;
the Trump Administration has claimed authority to disregard funding limitations
on law enforcement; and in particular instances the executive branch has
justified disregarding

statutory

limits

on prisoner releases,

interrogation

practices, and even targeted killings based on debatable internal constitutional
analysis.75

To some degree, this executive practice of independent constitutional
interpretation reflects basic practical imperatives. Because our constitutional
system (unlike some others) lacks any mechanism for advisory judicial opinions,

executive officials must make legal determinations on their own in the first
instance, with fingers crossed that courts will approve their conclusions in any
after-the-fact litigation. 76 Yet executive-branch constitutional interpretation also
has deeper conceptual underpinnings.
a.

Departmentalism in Theory and Practice

Under the theory of departmentalism, the constitutional separation of powers

properly implies that each branch (or "department") of the federal government

72 See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., JudicialSupremacy, Departmentalism, and the Rule of
Law in a Populist Age, 96 TEx. L. REv. 487, 489 (2018) (defining departmentalism as the
view that "each branch or department of government should interpret the Constitution for
itself, without any branch's interpretation necessarily binding the others").
73 See, e.g., Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 437 (2000) (explaining that
Congress cannot legislatively contradict Supreme Court's interpretation of law); Cooper v.
Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) (noting that Court's prior interpretation of Fourteenth
Amendment "is the supreme law of the land").
74 See Fallon, supra note 72, at 491 ("Our system is not, never has been, and probably
never could be one of pure judicial supremacy.").

71 See supra Section I.A.
76 See, e.g., Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 362 (1911) (explaining that federal
courts cannot "give opinions in the nature of advice concerning legislative action").
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may interpret the Constitution for itself in carrying out its core functions. 77
Courts thus interpret the Constitution in the course of deciding particular cases
that come before them. 78 But Congress does so as well when deciding what laws
to pass, and so does the executive branch when deciding how those laws should
be executed. Article II of the Constitution, after all, obligates the President to
"take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed." 79 Given that the Constitution
is the nation's paramount law, the executive branch must give effect to the
Constitution, rather than any statute or other sub-constitutional law, in carrying
out its core function of executing federal law-or so at least Presidents and
executive-branch lawyers have long claimed. 80
This theory has strong and weak forms, depending on the degree of
independence other branches assert from judicial interpretation. Some towering
Presidents, most notably Presidents Jefferson and Lincoln, asserted the theory in
strong form, claiming authority to completely disregard judicial precedent in
formulating executive views on constitutionality. 8 1 For reasons good and bad
(and despite some academic criticism), actual government practice today no
longer reflects such strong-form departmentalism. Presidents and Congresses
since at least the end of World War II have generally asserted interpretive
independence in the gaps and interstices of judicial precedent, not in outright
defiance of it. 82
77 The term "departmentalism" appears to have originated with Edward Corwin, who
distinguished between "juristic" and "departmentalist" conceptions of judicial review. See
EDWARD S. CORWIN, COURT OVER CONSTITUTION 4-6 (1938). For an account of Corwin's
insight,

see

generally KEITH

E. WHITTINGTON, POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS

OF JUDICIAL

SUPREMACY 29-30 (2007) (describing Corwin's "innovative reconceptualization of the
doctrine of judicial review"). For recent defenses of departmentalism, see, for example,
Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, The Executive's Duty to DisregardUnconstitutionalLaws, 96
GEO. L.J. 1613, 1628-48 (2008) (arguing that, based on history and structure of Constitution,
Presidents should not enforce unconstitutional statutes); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most
DangerousBranch: Executive Powerto Say What the Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217,228-82 (1994)
(theorizing that executive has coequal constitutional interpretation power with other
branches).
78 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) ("It is emphatically the
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.").
79 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
80 For an early statement of this theory, see Letter from Thomas Jefferson, President, U.S.,
to Edward Livingston, U.S. Attorney, Dist. ofN.Y. (Nov. 1, 1801), in 8 WRITINGS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON 57, 57-58 (Paul L. Ford ed., 1892-1899) (asserting that executive branch need not
enforce unconstitutional laws because they are "nullit[ies]").
81 See generally HAROLD H. BRUFF, UNTRODDEN GROUND: HOw PRESIDENTS INTERPRET
THE CONSTITUTION 63-66, 136-37 (2015) (discussing view of Presidents Jefferson and Lincoln

that they could independently determine constitutionality of statutes).
82 See, e.g., Daniel J. Meltzer, Executive Defense of CongressionalActs, 61 DUKE L.J.
1183, 1221 (2012) ("I think it is a fact-perhaps a contingent fact, perhaps on some views a
historically or normatively unjustified fact, but a fact nonetheless-that a court-centric
understanding of constitutional interpretation is deeply entrenched in both government
officials and the public.").
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Today, indeed, even declining to defend statutes in court may provoke
controversy. At the least, the Obama Administration sparked considerable
controversy by declining to defend the Defense of Marriage Act against an
equal-protection challenge, even though the Administration sought to facilitate

An extensive body of scholarship has addressed questions regarding executive-branch
constitutional interpretation, including the appropriate balance between departmentalism and
judicial supremacy. See generally Samuel A. Alito, Jr., Change in Continuity at the Office of
Legal Counsel, 15 CARDOZO L. REv. 507 (1993) (arguing that changes in administrations and
executive-branch interests impact OLC's constitutional interpretation); David Barron,
Constitutionalism in the Shadow ofDoctrine: The President'sNon-enforcement Power, LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter/Spring 2000, at 61 (claiming that "constitutional meaning is
shaped by, and should be shaped by, the institutional location of the interpreter"); Frank H.
Easterbrook, Unitary Executive Interpretation:A Comment, 15 CARDOZO L. REv. 313 (1993)
(advocating interpretive approach grounded on unitary executive theory); Harold Hongju

Koh, Protecting the Office of Legal Counsel from Itself, 15 CARDOZO L. REv. 513 (1993)

&

(arguing that stricter OLC policies will protect Office "from its own eagerness to please");
Dawn E. Johnsen, Faithfully Executing the Laws: Internal Legal Constraintson Executive
Power, 54 UCLA L. REv. 1559 (2007) (articulating best practices for OLC advice-giving);
Douglas W. Kmiec, OLC's Opinion Writing Function: The Legal Adhesive for a Unitary
Executive, 15 CARDozo L. REv. 337 (1993) (surveying OLC practice); Peter Margulies,
Foreword: Risk, Deliberation, and ProfessionalResponsibility, 1 J. NAT'L SECURITY L.
POL'Y 357 (2005) (discussing ethical concerns about government lawyer's role following
September 11 terrorist attacks); John O. McGinnis, Models of the Opinion Function of the
Attorney General: A Normative, Descriptive, and HistoricalProlegomenon, 15 CARDozO L.
REv. 375 (1993) (analyzing different approaches to OLC's opinion-writing function);
Randolph D. Moss, Executive Branch Legal Interpretation:A Perspectivefrom the Office of
Legal Counsel, 52 ADMIN. L. REv. 1303 (2000) (arguing that executive-branch lawyer should
work "within the framework of the best view of the law" while also "work[ing] within the
framework and tradition of executive branch legal interpretation and seek[ing] ways to further
the legal and policy goals of the administration he serves"); Cornelia T.L. Pillard, The
Unfulfilled Promise of the Constitution in Executive Hands, 103 MICH. L. REv. 676 (2005)
(arguing that "our current executive constitutionalism is underdeveloped even for the modest
role that judicial supremacy leaves it" and discussing possible reforms); Michel Rosenfeld,
Executive Autonomy, JudicialAuthority and the Rule of Law: Reflections on Constitutional
Interpretationand the Separationof Powers, 15 CARDozo L. REv. 137 (1993) (articulating
criteria for addressing conflicts between Supreme Court and executive branch over
constitutional interpretation); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Merryman Power and the
Dilemma of Autonomous Executive Branch Interpretation, 15 CARDOzO L. REv. 81 (1993)
(analyzing Ex parte Merryman as "most famous and extreme example of autonomous
executive constitutional interpretation"); David A. Strauss, PresidentialInterpretationof the
Constitution, 15 CARDozo L. REv. 113 (1993) (refuting theory "that the President is
sometimes entitled to claim direct access to 'the Constitution,' unmediated by constitutional
law as the courts have developed it"); W. Bradley Wendel, Government Lawyers, Democracy,
and the Rule of Law, 77 FORDHAM L. REv. 1333 (2009) (advocating "middle ground" that
"hold[s] on to the distinction between faithful interpretation of, and advising on, the law, and
improper politicization of the role of government lawyers, while acknowledging that
considerations of democratic legitimacy require that the President have considerable
discretion to establish a substantive, ideologically nonneutral policy agenda").
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ultimate judicial resolution of the question by continuing to enforce the statute
and pursuing appeals from adverse judgments. 83 The Trump Administration has
likewise faced strong criticism for advancing a debatable severance theory in
litigation regarding the Affordable Care Act.84 The political firestorm that surely
would have attended a decision to disregard either statute altogether may
illustrate just how far we have descended from the high water mark of anti-Court
departmentalism set by President Lincoln.
That said, current political dynamics could conceivably cause departmentalist
practice to strengthen. According to one leading political science account, the
"domesticated" departmentalism of our time is typical for periods of relatively
stable constitutional politics, whereas more brazen presidential defiance of
judicial constitutional understandings typically arises in periods of political
transition, such as those that surrounded the Jefferson, Lincoln, and Franklin
Delano Roosevelt Administrations. 85 To the extent we are entering a new period

of political reconfiguration, another such period of sharp conflict might well
arise, making the questions addressed here even more acute. 86
Whether or not such adjustments occur, however, even the more modest,
interstitial departmentalism of recent times leaves considerable space for
weighty independent legal determinations by Presidents and their lawyers.
Again, based just on recent internal opinions and signing statements, executive
officials might engage in diplomatic activities, criminal prosecutions, prisoner
transfers, or even targeted killings or interrogation practices based on debatable
internal constitutional analysis. 87 As such examples illustrate, some degree of

executive authority over constitutional interpretation is an entrenched feature of
government practice, notwithstanding the risk it inevitably carries of inducing
reliance on flawed executive views.

83 For discussion of this controversy, see, for example, Meltzer, supra note 82, at 1186,

1213-15.
84 See

Nick Bagley, Texas Fold 'Em, TAKE CARE BLOG (June
https://takecareblog.com/blog/texas-fold-em [https://perma.cc/Y55S-FWDV].

7, 2018),

85 See WHITTINGTON, supra note 77, at 23, 53-55.
86 In fact, following the recent bitter controversy over Justice Kavanaugh's appointment

to the Supreme Court, some progressives have called for aggressive deployment of
departmentalist theories or other forms of resistance by current or future Democratic
Presidents or state officials. See, e.g., Joshua Holland, Don't Just Pack the Court. Reimagine
It., THE NATION (June 4, 2019), https://www.thenation.com/article/supreme-court-reformcourt-packing-term-limits/ [https://perma.cc/9LFU-66YN] (characterizing progressive use of
departmentalism as a "straightforward but risky" option); Dylan Matthews, Court-Packing,
Democrats'Nuclear Optionfor the Supreme Court, Explained, Vox (Oct. 5, 2018, 3:49 PM),
https://www.vox.com/20 18/7/2/17513520/court-packing-explained-fdr-roosevelt-new-dealdemocrats-supreme-court [https://perma.cc/N8HA-SELF] (discussing progressive calls for
court-packing).
17 See supra Section I.A.
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The Justice Department'sInstitutionalRole

Beyond the theory and practice of departmentalism itself, the institutional
authorities and attributes of the Justice Department in general and OLC in
particular further support recognizing some independent executive authority
over interpretation. The President, of course, heads the executive branch, and
departmentalist theory often associates executive interpretive authority with the
President's constitutional authority and electoral accountability. 88 But the
Attorney General and his or her assistants also hold relevant authorities. By
statute, the U.S. Attorney General is the nation's chief legal officer, with
authority to direct most federal criminal enforcement. 89 In addition, he or she
holds specific authority to provide legal advice and opinions when requested by
the President or heads of civil or military departments. 90 This function-the
Attorney General's oldest, predating by half a century the Justice Department's

establishment as a law enforcement agency 91-has long entailed effective
authority to resolve contested legal questions for the executive branch. Today,
by delegation from the Attorney General, the Assistant Attorney General for
OLC typically exercises this function. 92
A number of conventional understandings, expectations, and practices
reinforce these formal statutory authorities. For one thing, as a matter of practice,
if not law, OLC opinions are binding throughout the executive branch, unless

and until they are overturned by the President or Attorney General. 93 Reflecting

88 See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 72, at 495-97 (discussing connection between
departmentalism and popular constitutionalism).
89 See 28 U.S.C. § 516 (2018) ("Except as otherwise authorized by law, the conduct of
litigation in which the United States, an agency, or officer thereof is a party, or is interested,
and securing evidence therefor, is reserved to officers of the Department of Justice, under the
direction of the Attorney General."); id. § 547(1) ("[E]ach United States attorney, within his
district, shall ... prosecute for all offenses against the United States.").
9° Id. § 511 ("The Attorney General shall give his advice and opinion on questions of law
when required by the President."); id. § 512 ("The head of an executive department may
require the opinion of the Attorney General on questions of law arising in the administration
of his department."); id. § 513 ("When a question of law arises in the administration of the
Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, or the Department of the Air Force,
the cognizance of which is not given by statute to some other officer from whom the Secretary
of the military department concerned may require advice, the Secretary of the military
department shall send it to the Attorney General for disposition.").
9| See Susan Low Bloch, The Early Role of the Attorney General in Our Constitutional
Scheme: In the Beginning There Was Pragmatism, 1989 DUKE L.J. 561, 566-67 (explaining
limited power of Attorney General when position was first created).
92 See 28 C.F.R. § 0.25 (2019) (delegating Attorney General's opinion-writing function
and other tasks to Assistant Attorney General for OLC).
93 Morrison, supra note 34, at 63 ("[O]nce OLC arrives at an answer, it is treated as binding
within the executive branch unless overruled by the Attorney General or the President."); see
also JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY: LAW AND JUDGMENT INSIDE THE BUSH
ADMINISTRATION 96 (2007) [hereinafter GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY] (noting

widespread assumption that prosecution for conduct approved by OLC is "practically
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this norm, independent agencies generally must agree to be bound by OLC's
opinion before OLC will address a matter that concerns them. 94
Much like a court, furthermore, OLC presumptively adheres to internal
precedent

across

administrations,

a practice

that encourages

bipartisan

consistency and integrity in interpretation, even if the resulting precedents
typically take broad views of executive authority. 95 As a matter of reputation and
self-understanding and even in some cases professional ethics, 96 OLC lawyers
also conventionally understand their institutional role to center on providing
credible, objective legal advice. 97 In other words, while mission-driven agencies
may naturally lean towards legal interpretations that advance their own
particular policy objectives, OLC's bureaucratic function, as a matter of both
legal authority and institutional self-understanding, is uniquely focused on
providing credible, generalist advice. 98 Accordingly, although OLC's lawyers
may face cross-cutting pressure to approve administration programs, the

Office's head signing a legal opinion at least risks significant reputational harm
if the opinion lacks credibility in the broader legal community. 99

impossible"); Jack Goldsmith, Executive Branch Crisis Lawyering and the "Best View," 31
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 261, 274 (2018) ("If the Justice Department signs off, those who rely
on it in good faith are effectively immunized from subsequent prosecution."). Civil service
lawyers throughout the executive branch of course play a vital role in upholding law-bound
governance. See David Fontana, Executive Branch Legalisms, 126 HARV. L. REv. F. 21, 42
(2012) ("Civil service lawyers have the final word on executive-branch law in a large number
of situations."). Administrative agencies also may engage in constitutional analysis or at least
resolve questions with constitutional implications. See generally Gillian E. Metzger,
Administrative Constitutionalism, 91 TEx. L. REv. 1897 (2013) (arguing that federal
administrative agencies frequently interpret the Constitution). Nevertheless, the Justice
Department in general and OLC in particular are generally assumed to have unique authority
to authoritatively resolve constitutional questions for the executive branch as a whole.
9 See, e.g., Memorandum from David J. Barron, Acting Assistant Attorney Gen., Office
of Legal Counsel, for the Attorneys of the Office 2 (July 16, 2010) [hereinafter OLC Best

Practices

Memo],

https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/legacy/2010/08/26/olc-

legal-advice-opinions.pdf [https://perma.cc/8TRN-9HE2].
9s In a survey of public opinions through 2009, Professor Trevor Morrison found that OLC
fairly reliably adhered to its own prior precedents over time. Trevor W. Morrison, Stare
Decisis in the Office of Legal Counsel, 110 COLUM. L. REv. 1448, 1458, 1480-84 (2010)
(discussing degree of OLC's adherence to precedent); see also, e.g., GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR
PRESIDENCY, supra note 93, at 35-36 (noting that OLC's decision-making process involves
examining both judicial precedent and executive-branch precedent).
96 For a discussion of ethical principles applicable to government lawyers generally and
OLC specifically, see LUBAN, supra note 5, at 234-40.
97 See, e.g., GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY, supra note 93, at 37-38 (describing
"cultural norms" of "detachment and professional integrity that permeate OLC and that
transcend particular administrations").
98

99

See id.

See GOLDSMITH, supra note 8, at 238 (discussing "brutal recriminations" against authors
of interrogation opinions).
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OLC's interpretive function, to be sure, is not exclusive. Through signing
statements and other pronouncements, presidents themselves may take positions
on constitutional questions (though even then they typically do so in consultation
with OLC lawyers). 100 In addition, one scholar recently argued that the
traditional "formalist" model of Justice Department legal guidance, in which
agencies seek guidance from OLC in the form of well-crafted legal opinions, is
withering.1 0 1 On this account, OLC's traditional approach is giving way to an
alternative "porous" model in which executive legal positions derive from a

more open-ended set of discussions between affected agencies-discussions that
are deliberately suffused with considerations of politics and policy as well as
law. 102 Along similar lines, another scholar has highlighted ways in which the
triggering event for an executive-branch legal determination may shape

bureaucratic decision-making in potentially outcome-determinative ways. 103
Nevertheless, and somewhat paradoxically, the institutional attributes that
make OLC advice more credible (and thus in principle less manipulable) may
also make it more politically valuable in some circumstances. 104 At the least,
recent experience suggests some practical political imperative to follow the so-

called formalist model on matters of significant controversy. The Obama
Administration issued public OLC opinions on such matters as the permissibility
of contested appointments,1 05 the legality of military action,10 6 and the validity
of a controversial immigration program.107 The Trump Administration has done

loo See, e.g., Ronald A. Cass & Peter L. Strauss, The PresidentialSigning Statements
Controversy, 16 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 11, 14 (2007) ("Presidential signing statements
are formal documents issued by the President, after wide consultation within the executive
branch, when he signs an enacted bill into law."); see also Memorandum on Presidential
Signing Statements, 2009 DAILY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1, 1-2 (Mar. 9, 2009) ("[E]xecutive branch
departments and agencies are directed to seek the advice of the Attorney General before
relying on signing statements issued prior to the date of this memorandum .... ").
101 See Renan, supranote 11, at 809-10. Although Attorneys General (and later OLC) have
issued legal opinions since the beginning of the Republic, Renan argues that the formalist
model had its "heyday" during the Carter Administration, when the President and Attorney
General deliberately sought to reestablish legal credibility following the Nixon
Administration's scandals. Id. at 817-18.
102 See id.
103 Rebecca Ingber, InterpretationCatalysts andExecutive Branch Legal Decisionmaking,
38 YALE J. INT'L L. 359, 421 (2013) (concluding that how a question is raised and framed as
well as actors involved "play a dramatic role within the executive in forcing a decision to the
fore and shaping every step of the process toward the ultimate substantive result").
104 See Nelson Lund, Rational Choice at the Office of Legal Counsel, 15 CARDOZo L. REv.
437, 458 (1993) (noting President's likely desire for adverse advice in some circumstances).
05 See Lawfulness of Recess Appointments During a Recess of the Senate
Notwithstanding Periodic Pro Forma Sessions, 36 Op. O.L.C., 2012 WL 168645, at *1 (Jan.

6, 2012).
106 OLC Libya Memo, supra note 25, at *1.
107 OLC Immigration Memo, supra note 26, at *25.
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so with respect to employment of a close relative in the White House, 108 defiance
of certain congressional inquiries, 109 and replacement of a high-profile acting
agency director, 1 0 among other things.' 1" At the same time, critics blasted both
Administrations for failing to produce public opinions supporting actions of
comparable gravity, such as the Obama Administration's apparent disregard of
the sixty-day War Powers Resolution deadline and the Trump Administration's

use of military force in Syria.' 12 In response to political pressure with respect to
the latter question, OLC eventually released an opinion justifying one set of
airstrikes." 3 In keeping with OLC's ethic of consistency across time, moreover,
the opinion justified the strike's legality using a framework developed in prior
opinions, including a prominent one from the previous administration. 1 4
Whatever forces shape the interpretive process in other instances, this pattern

suggests at least some continuing, politically enforced expectation that the White
House will obtain an OLC or Attorney General opinion on key constitutional
questions.
In sum, both statutory and practical considerations support recognizing a
special role for the Justice Department in general and OLC in particular in
carrying out the executive branch's departmentalist function of independent
constitutional interpretation. To the extent, however, that executive

constitutional determinations are either legally or practically binding, presidents
and their lawyers may hold the effective capacity to excuse the inexcusable and
undermine the rule of law. This risk brings us to another key separation-ofpowers principle: the principle that executive officials generally lack authority
to suspend statutes.
2.

Self-Authorizing and the Antisuspending Principle

Why is self-authorizing executive interpretation problematic? Naturally, any
flawed legal analysis may violate rule-of-law principles if it licenses what the
108 Application of the Anti-Nepotism Statute to a Presidential Appointment in the White

House Office, 41 Op. O.L.C., 2017 WL 5653623, at *1 (Jan. 20, 2017).
109 Authority of Individual Members of Congress to Conduct Oversight of the Executive
Branch, 41 Op. O.L.C., 2017 WL 5653624, at *1 (May 1, 2017).
110 Designating an Acting Director of the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection, 41

Op. O.L.C., 2017 WL 10087535, at *1 (Nov. 25, 2017).

1" See, e.g., OLC HBC Memo, supra note 23, at *18 (concluding that restriction on certain
educational loans violated Free Exercise Clause).
12 See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, Opinion, Obama's Illegal War in Libya, N.Y. TIMES, June
20, 2011, at A27 (reproaching Obama Administration for exceeding War Powers Resolution
deadline in Libya); Justin Florence & Allison Murphy, The Syria War Powers Memo: Why It
Matters, LAWFARE BLOG (Feb. 14, 2018, 4:12 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/syria-war(advocating release of
[https://perma.cc/27H2-ASW9]
powers-memo-why-it-matters
reported Trump Administration legal opinion supporting Syria strikes because of "its
relevance to ongoing and potential future military actions").
"3 April 2018 Airstrikes Against Syrian Chemical-Weapons Facilities, 42 Op. O.L.C.,
2018 WL 2760027, at *1 (May 31, 2018).
114 See id. at *5-7 (discussing OLC Libya Memo).
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law prohibits. Furthermore, serving as a judge in one's own case, as executive-

branch interpreters effectively do by determining the law applicable to their own
branch, is often described as violating a core background principle of natural
justice and constitutional law." 5 Whatever the force of that principle in
general,1 6 however, concerns about self-authorization in the particular
separation-of-powers context addressed here may draw force from a more
specific limit on executive power: the principle that executive officials lack
authority to "suspend" or cancel statutory restraints.

This principle is in fact at least one central meaning of the Take Care Clause
itself. By obligating the President to ensure "that the Laws be faithfully
executed,"" 7 this Clause makes plain that Presidents, unlike the English
monarchs of old, possess no authority to suspend statutes or grant dispensations

from their application.11 8 Presidents of course do hold authority to pardon federal
criminal offenses after the fact." 9 But they cannot license violations or cancel
statutory prohibitions ahead of time; their duty is to faithfully execute statutory
law, not to wipe away laws they deem unwise or inconvenient.
Early federal decisions reflect this understanding. In the 1806 case United
States v. Smith, 2 0 Supreme Court Justice William Paterson, riding circuit,

deemed supposed presidential approval of an alleged criminal enterprise
irrelevant for the simple reason that neither the Constitution nor applicable
2
statutes gave a "dispensing power to the President."'1 Under our system of

separated powers, Paterson argued, executive officials hold no constitutional
power to "authorize a person to do what the law forbids"; any other rule "would

".5 See, e.g., R.H. Helmholz, Bonham's Case, Judicial Review, and the Law of Nature, 1
J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 325, 335 (2009) ("There is no doubt, in the first place, that acting as a
judge in one's own cause had long been regarded as a violation of the law of nature.").
116 The rule against judging one's own case might in fact be too often "honored in the
breach" to be considered a binding general norm. See Adrian Vermeule, ContraNemu Iudex
in Sua Causa: The Limits of Impartiality, 122 YALE L.J. 384, 416 (2012) (deriding this
principle's "[f]acile invocation[]" as "the intellectual equivalent of burping at a dinner party"
(alterations in original) (quoting Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case Against Judicial
Review, 115 YALE L.J. 1346, 1401 (2006))).

117 See U.S. CONST. art. 11, § 3, cl. 1.
"I For my defense of this view, see Zachary S. Price, Enforcement Discretion and
Executive Duty, 67 VAND. L. REv. 671, 768-69 (2014). See also Adam B. Cox & Cristina M.
Rodriguez, The President& Immigration Law Redux, 125 YALE L.J. 104, 143 (2015) (noting
general agreement that "President cannot decline to enforce altogether a law that is
constitutional"). For a contrary view that the Take Care Clause does not embody an
antisuspending principle but that Presidents nonetheless lack suspending power, see
SAIKRISHNA BANGALORE PRAKASH, IMPERIAL FROM THE BEGINNING: THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE ORIGINAL EXECUTIVE 92-93 (2015).

19 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
120 27 F. Cas. 1192 (C.C.D.N.Y. 1806) (No. 16,342).
121 Id. at 1229.
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render the execution of the laws dependent on [the President's] will and
pleasure," despite Congress's sole authority to change the law itself.122
Around the same time, the full Supreme Court held in Little v. Barreme123 that
executive "instructions . .. cannot legalize an act which without those
instructions would have been a plain trespass."1 24 Much as the court in Smith
rejected any executive dispensing power, the Supreme Court in Little upheld the

imposition of damages liability on an individual officer despite the officer's
reliance on mistaken presidential assurances. 125 A few decades later, in Kendall
v. United States ex rel. Stokes,1 26 the Court went so far as to dismiss out of hand
any idea that the Take Care Clause allows dispensations from statutory

requirements. "To contend," the Court wrote, "that the obligation imposed on
the President to see the laws faithfully executed[] implies a power to forbid their
execution[] is a novel construction of the constitution, and entirely
inadmissible." 127
As I have argued elsewhere, this understanding of the Take Care Clause
remains basic to the federal government's structural organization and the
subordination of executive officials to law.1 28 It explains, at a fundamental level,
why agencies must carry out their organic statutes and why legal restraints apply
to the President. Here, though, if taken to its logical limit, the antisuspending

principle might suggest that executive officials should never claim constitutional
authority to disregard statutory restraints, as any such assertion would amount
to a suspending power by another name. Indeed, one scholar has challenged the
entire notion of departmentalism on this basis. 129 "The claim that a president
may refuse to enforce a law on the ground that it is unconstitutional is but a
reincarnation of the royal prerogative of suspending the laws," Professor
Christopher May has argued.13 0 "The Constitution does not give the president a
122

Id. at 1230.

123 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804) (per curiam).
124 Id. at 179.
125 Id.
126 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524 (1838). For scholarly arguments that Presidents hold
no authority
to defy duly enacted statutes, see, for example, EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE
AND POWERS, 1787-1984, at 72 (Randall W. Bland et al. eds., 5th ed. 1984) ("[O]nce a statute
has been duly enacted . . . [the President] must promote its enforcement by all the powers
constitutionally at his disposal unless and until enforcement is prevented by regular judicial
process."); Eugene Gressman, Take Care, Mr. President, 64 N.C. L. REv. 381, 382 (1986)
("[O]nce a bill has passed through all the constitutional forms of enactment and has become
a law, perhaps even over a presidential veto grounded on constitutional objections, the
President has no option under article II but to enforce the measure faithfully.").

127 Kendall, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) at 613.
128 Price, supra note 118, at 689-93.

129

CHRISTOPHER

N.

MAY, PRESIDENTIAL DEFIANCE OF "UNCONSTITUTIONAL"

LAWS:

REvIvING THE ROYAL PREROGATIVE, at xiv (1998) ("The claimed authority to defy allegedly
invalid laws threatens to further enhance the already 'imperial' trappings of the American
presidency.").
130 Id. at 37.
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power to suspend the laws, not even when the chief executive may think that a
particular law is unconstitutional." 131
Stated so broadly, May's argument goes too far. Even if departmentalism
itself is not inevitably implied by the constitutional separation of powers, the
executive practice of disregarding at least some laws on constitutional grounds
has deep roots and sound textual and theoretical underpinnings, as we have
seen. 132 Departmentalism is accordingly just as much a feature of the legal

landscape as is the antisuspending principle itself. After all, Presidents can no
more suspend the Constitution than any underlying statutes and therefore must

interpret the Constitution as well as those statutes in carrying out their executive
133
functions-or so at least Presidents since Thomas Jefferson have claimed.
Nevertheless, May's analysis does capture the essential nature of the problem.
The issue is not simply that executive officials might violate particular laws with
impunity; rather, the key danger is that presidents and their lawyers will acquire
unilateral power to wipe away statutory restraints through unprincipled
constitutional interpretation. To the extent that sound constitutional analysis
requires the executive branch to stay within statutory bounds in conducting
diplomacy, employing particular interrogation techniques, or taking military

action, the executive branch's asserted power to take action based on its own
self-serving constitutional conclusions could indeed amount to a de facto
executive suspending power.

Standing alone, this risk would support judicial skepticism about executive-i
branch constitutional views in any litigation directly contesting them. In fact,
OLC's track record in recent litigation is not strong: courts have rejected its
134
views on National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB") quorum requirements,
136
135
among other
and immigration enforcement discretion,
recess appointments,
things. 137 Courts in all these cases have exercised their own departmentalist
prerogative to resolve justiciable controversies based on legal conclusions of

131

Id.

132 See supra Section I1.B.1.
133 See generally BRUFF, supra note 81, at 63-66 (discussing Jefferson's views as
President). For a critique of the historical foundations for this claimed authority, see Matthew
Steilen, JudicialReview and Non-enforcement at the Founding, 17 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 479,
481-82 (2014) (disputing analogy between judicial review and presidential nonenforcement
based on founding-era history).
14 See, e.g., NLRB v. Noel Canning, 573 U.S. 513, 557 (2014) (rejecting purported recess
appointments to NLRB).
15

See, e.g., New Process Steel, LP v. NLRB, 560 U.S. 674, 687 (2010) (holding that

NLRB requires quorum of three members as opposed to two).
136 See, e.g., Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 146 (5th Cir. 2015) (affirming
preliminary injunction against proposed immigration relief programs), aff'd by an equally

divided Court, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016).
1? See Sonia Mittal, OLC's Day in Court: Judicial Deference to the Office of Legal
Counsel, 9 HARV. L. & PoL'Y REv. 211, 212 (2015) (concluding based on survey of opinions
that Supreme Court "rarely cites to OLC opinions" and "has resisted explicitly according them
deference under Chevron and Skidmore").
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their own that depart from those of the executive branch. But doing so in the
context at issue here-suits seeking sanctions or liability against officials who
themselves relied on authoritative executive-branch legal guidance-implicates
yet another set of countervailing considerations: fairness and good-government
concerns about reneging on past assurances.

3.

Fairness and Good Government

The last key consideration implicated by the self-authorization problem is the
one that we started with: the risk of unfairness, uncertainty, and demoralization
that could result from penalizing actions that the government itself had
approved. As a general matter, it may be profoundly unfair to discipline an
official after the fact for conduct undertaken in reliance on authoritative
constitutional guidance-and yet it is this very sense of unfairness and the
resulting impulse to protect official reliance that give rise to the potential
antisuspending problem addressed earlier.
Again, for the individual official-whether a CIA officer, diplomat, military
officer, or something else-defying superior directives might well place the
individual at risk of termination or other sanctions; in the military context, it
could even result in criminal prosecution.1 38 But if the legal guidance in question
proves flawed, then the officials in question could face after-the-fact penalties
for actions that their superiors directed and that government lawyers determined
were lawful. Even apart from the potential unfairness of such a bait-and-switch,
imposing liability in such circumstances could risk corroding government
regularity and efficiency and encouraging insubordination: if subordinate
officials cannot rely on legal directives and opinions obtained through the proper
channels, then they must fall back on their own intuitions or perhaps on some

form of outside legal advice. Officials might even stop seeking legal guidance
at all, to the detriment of overall legal compliance. Why seek a legal opinion if
it won't be worth the paper it's written on?

For all these reasons, punishing government officials for actions approved by
authoritative internal legal advice is concerning. And yet, once again, the very
instinct to protect the official's reliance and withhold punishment is what creates
the antisuspending problem in the first place. Presidents or their lawyers might
suspend legal restraints on executive-branch action by adopting dubious
constitutional theories and then inviting reliance upon them.
We thus finally confront the problem's full difficulty. While departmentalism
provides

a

theoretical

basis

for

independent

executive

constitutional

interpretation, this tradition creates a risk of abusive, self-authorizing
interpretations that improperly suspend statutory restraints on the executive
itself. Yet at the same time, failing to protect subordinate officials' reliance on

131

10 U.S.C. § 892 (2018) ("Any [member of the armed forces] who ...

(1) violates or

fails to obey any lawful general order or regulation; (2) having knowledge of any other lawful
order issued by a member of the armed forces, which it is his duty to obey, fails to obey the
order; or (3) is derelict in the performance of his duties; shall be punished as a court-martial

may direct.").
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executive constitutional interpretations risks gross unfairness, uncertainty, and

demoralization within the executive branch.
III.

A CALIBRATED RELIANCE DEFENSE

Any due process protection for reliance in this context must therefore
reconcile the fairness principle that animates existing case law with two other,
largely incommensurate principles: a departmentalism principle that supports

executive-branch authority to independently interpret the Constitution and an
antisuspending principle that precludes any default executive authority to

eliminate disfavored statutes.1 39 Balancing these competing considerations is
ultimately a matter of allocating the burden of interpretive uncertainty. Should

the risk of legal error fall on the government officials who are themselves targets
of statutory regulation, or should their reliance on flawed constitutional analysis

by government lawyers provide immunity from after-the-fact liability? How,
furthermore, should courts answer this question in cases where conventional
interpretive considerations point in different directions or where the executive
branch holds settled views that courts might not embrace in the first instance?
Suppose, for example, that the original understanding of war powers is at odds
with longstanding executive practice1 40 or that longstanding executive views on

presidential authority over diplomacy are in tension with the constitutional text
and structure. 141Should presidents and their lawyers get to make the choice, with
the consequence that officials carrying out policy may violate statutory restraints
with impunity? Or should courts have the last word, as they normally do in
constitutional litigation?1 42
In fact, under the best view of the law, formed by aligning relevant case law

with background structural and normative considerations, these questions should
have different answers in different litigation settings. In this Part, I will address

in turn the three main settings in which the question may arise: (A) reliance on
a signed OLC or Attorney General opinion in penal litigation; (B) reliance on
other executive legal determinations in such litigation; and (C) reliance on either
form of executive guidance in other types of litigation, including constitutional
tort suits and enforcement actions against private parties.
Reliance on OLC or Attorney General Opinions in PenalLitigation

A.

A first possible litigation context is a public enforcement suit seeking civil or
criminal penalties for past legal violations undertaken by public officials in
139

See supra Section I.B.

40 See, e.g., Michael D. Ramsey, Textualism and War Powers, 69 U.

CHI.

L. REv. 1543,

1543-44 (2002) (arguing that Constitution gives Congress alone the power to initiate offensive
warfare).
"' See, e.g., Ryan M. Scoville, Ad Hoc Diplomats, 68 DuKE L.J. 907, 920-21 (2019)
(questioning executive practice of employing ad hoc envoys for diplomatic purposes).
142 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 138 (1803) ("An act of congress repugnant
to the constitution cannot become a law. The courts of the United States are bound to take
notice of the constitution.").
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reliance on a legal opinion from OLC or the Attorney General. Although I am
aware of no recent prosecution fitting this description, this scenario is precisely
what some hoped for-and indeed advocated as a necessary vindication of the
rule of law-following the repudiation of the Torture Memos 4 3 Certain
electronic surveillance authorized by an unsigned Bush Administration opinion
could also have been criminal if the opinion's constitutional conclusions were
wrong, 144 and other examples addressed earlier, such as drone strikes and
disregard for statutory spending limitations, could implicate the same
problem. 145
Should due process bar prosecution in such cases? Except when the advice in
question was not only wrong but unreasonable, the answer should be yes. This
result not only best accommodates the key structural considerations but also
draws strength from analogous administrative law cases and anti-entrapment
precedent, as I will show.
1.

Structural Analysis

In this context, fairness and departmentalism should generally outweigh
antisuspending concerns, thus yielding a rule of deference to executive
conclusions in after-the-fact litigation.
Fairness concerns are at their apex in penal suits reneging on prior

authoritative guidance. That is so not only because of the penal character of the
remedies at issue but also because reliance on a formal legal opinion obtained
from an office dedicated to this purpose presents the most compelling case for
individual good faith. Indeed, assuming at least a modicum of professionalism
within the federal bureaucracy, protecting reliance on such formal legal
guidance should generally advance the good-government objective of legal
compliance. After all, if seeking advice provides greater legal security,
government officials will have greater incentive to seek it-even when doing so
means receiving advice that particular planned initiatives are unlawful.
To be sure, even if a legal green light did not provide such immunity, officials
might still seek guidance on close questions in order to accurately gauge their
own legal exposure or ensure legal compliance for its own sake. Some might
thus argue that, much as with private legal advice, an official legal opinion

should provide security against future punishment only insofar as it accurately
predicts courts' eventual view of the law. This view, however, could place
government personnel in an untenable position. For one thing, such officials will
typically lack adequate legal understanding to judge the quality of official legal
opinions on abstruse constitutional or statutory topics. Unlike many private

parties, moreover, they cannot readily obtain accurate external advice. Even if
some private lawyer could be found who possesses the relevant expertise,
government secrecy requirements could preclude consulting external counsel. In
143 See supra Section I.A.
144 For critical analysis of these legal determinations, see PETER M. SHANE, MADISON'S
NIGHTMARE: How EXECUTIVE POWER THREATENS AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 88-89 (2009).
"

See supra Section L.A.
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addition, once again, insofar as official guidance is binding on the executive
branch, defying such guidance (whether by acting or refusing to act) could mean
risking removal or other sanctions for insubordination. 146
On top of these fairness and good-government concerns, the departmentalism

principle further weighs in favor of protecting reliance in this context. The
executive branch's authority to interpret the Constitution for itself in the first
instance would be a dead letter if criminal prosecution were possible based on
subsequent judicial disagreement with executive-branch attorneys' conclusions.
Executive-branch lawyering would then be reduced to a matter of accurately

predicting future judicial conclusions rather than interpreting the Constitution
for itself in keeping with its own traditions and past decisions.
That said, judicial-executive disagreement could arise in the first place only

if the executive branch chose, at a later point in time, to pursue criminal or civil
enforcement notwithstanding its own prior advice. The executive branch thus
could protect the departmentalism principle for itself by declining to initiate any
court proceedings. A pure theory of departmentalism might thus suggest that

courts should never take executive-branch opinions into account because courts
have an independent responsibility to decide cases presented to them based on
their own best view of the law.14 7 Yet relying on a later executive branch to
protect an earlier one ultimately provides inadequate protection for the
functional and practical values that departmentalism advances. Government
personnel must decide in the moment whether to act prospectively on the basis
of current advice. Accordingly, even apart from fairness and good-government

concerns, failing to protect government officials' past reliance would only erode
the executive branch's long-term autonomy in performing functions other than
prosecution, such as conducting foreign policy, protecting national security, or
administering laws.

On the other side of the balance, antisuspending concerns are acute in this
context. To the extent formal legal guidance will support a later reliance defense
against enforcement, senior officials may have an incentive to orchestrate sham
opinions that approve planned initiatives on specious grounds or at least to
appoint lawyers known in advance to hold an ideology or disposition that makes
such approval likely. Recent controversies over the Torture Memos and other
opinions suggest this risk is real and not hypothetical.
48
Nevertheless-and this point is crucial to distinctions I draw later1 -the

standard process of producing a signed OLC or Attorney General opinion carries
institutional safeguards that may at least mitigate these risks. Much as is true of

public opinion writing by courts, an obligation to articulate how conclusions
follow from generally accepted legal premises necessarily rules out some results
that might otherwise be rubber-stamped. Some conclusions, as they say, just
146 Cf 10 U.S.C. § 892 (2018) (criminalizing disobedience of lawful orders by military
personnel).
"' See Marbury, 5. U.S. (1 Cranch) at 138 ("The courts of the United States are bound to
take notice of the constitution.")

148 See infra Section IIIB.
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won't write, at least not in a way that external observers would accept as
professionally valid. Indeed, in the Torture Memos example, the lead lawyers
only narrowly escaped professional discipline for their flawed advice and the
Justice Department's internal critique of their work centered on their failure to
account for obvious contrary authorities and counterarguments. 149
The institutional attributes highlighted earlier reinforce this discipline. Again,
OLC's value within the government bureaucracy

is its institutional self-

understanding as an office devoted to providing professionally competent,
objective legal advice.15 0 While that self-understanding surely does not inoculate
OLC and its politically appointed leadership against all pressures to approve
politically sensitive initiatives, it does support an ethos in which adhering to past
positions and rejecting proposed initiatives comports with OLC's own sense of
its mission. 51

Accordingly, at least so long as OLC's core institutional attributesdelegated statutory authority over executive interpretation combined with a
reputational interest in preserving objectivity and credibility-remain in place,

background structural considerations should generally support shielding
officials from penal sanctions when they relied in good faith on formal OLC
advice. Doing so may carry costs to the rule of law insofar as OLC guidance is

sometimes mistaken and indeed, in the long run, may systematically skew
toward permissive conclusions. But institutional constraints provide some
assurance of professional reasonableness, the fairness and demoralization costs
of throwing government officials under the bus are high, and allowing later

punishment by an administration with different leanings would disrupt
departmentalist practices on which all executive-branch legal interpretation
ultimately depends. For all these reasons, the overall balance of relevant
considerations generally favors protecting reliance.
Nonetheless, a rule of absolute reliance protection would go too far. Such

absolute protection could enhance the very risks it aims to avoid: if reliance
protection were guaranteed, no matter how flawed the opinion in question,
political actors' incentive to capture and corrupt OLC's decision-making could
become overwhelming. To provide an ultimate backstop against this risk, the
reliance defense here must give out at some point, and that point may best be
defined in terms of whether the legal conclusions in question were reasonable,

149 Margolis Memo, supra note 14, at 64-69 (discussing flaws in Torture Memos but
nonetheless declining to refer their authors for bar discipline).
"' See supra Section II.B.1.b (explaining how OLC employees typically understand
OLC's function).
151 See, e.g., Trevor W. Morrison, ConstitutionalAlarmism,124 HARv. L. REv. 1688, 1722
(2011) ("Put simply, if OLC says yes too readily to its clients, it will no longer be useful to
them. OLC maintains its position as the most important centralized source of legal advice
within the executive branch not because any provision of positive law makes it so, but because
its legal advice is uniquely valuable to its clients.").
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even if ultimately incorrect in a court's later judgment. 15 2 I will return
momentarily to the Torture Memos and other examples that may usefully

illustrate where this line falls. But first, to provide stronger grounding for this
principle and bring existing precedent back into the picture, it remains to
consider how well this structural account accords with existing reliance case law.
2.

Precedent from Administrative Law and Criminal Law

Analogous cases from both administrative law and criminal law reinforce a
rule protecting reliance on reasonable OLC or Attorney General opinions.
Again, cases in neither area are squarely on point. But even recognizing their

limitations, these authorities offer indirect support for elaborating reliance
defenses along the lines I have proposed.
To begin with, in administrative law, the Supreme Court has recognized that

executive statutory interpretations often warrant greater deference when issued
through more formal deliberative processes. Under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v.

NaturalResources Defense Council, Inc.,153 courts generally defer to reasonable
agency constructions of ambiguous statutes, 154 and in City of Arlington v.
FCC,155 the Court extended this principle even to self-authorizing agency
interpretations of the agency's own jurisdiction. 156 Under United States v. Mead
Corp.,157 however, the formality of the agency's decision-making process
factors importantly in whether the agency's interpretation receives such
deference under Chevron.158

"I Robert Bauer has argued that executive-branch lawyers dealing with national security
crises should generally eschew any search for the "best view" of the law and instead employ
a more open-ended analysis in which "strong, reasonable, or even plausible legal theories
[are] good enough." Bauer, supra note 11, at 250. Whatever the merits of Bauer's proposal
for national security lawyers in general, my argument is not that OLC itself should abandon
a search for the best view of the law but rather that courts considering reliance defenses after
the fact should protect officials' reliance insofar as OLC's conclusions were reasonable. On
my account, such judicial deference is appropriate precisely because OLC holds an
institutional culture and other attributes that encourage objective legal analysis. My approach
would give less immunizing power to lawyers whose positions are less focused on legal
objectivity. See infra Section III.B.
153 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
154 Id. at 843 ("[I]f the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the
question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction
of the statute.").

55 569 U.S. 290 (2013).
156 Id. at 303 ("[W]e have applied Chevron where concerns about agency selfaggrandizement are at their apogee .... ").

157 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
158 Id. at 230-33 ("[T]he overwhelming number of our cases applying Chevron deference
have reviewed the fruits of notice-and-comment rulemaking or formal adjudication."); see
also Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 222 (2002) (identifying "the careful consideration the
Agency has given the question over a long period of time" as a key factor in determining
whether to recognize Chevron deference); Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587
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In particular, although "the fact that [an agency] previously reached its
interpretation through means less formal than 'notice and comment' rulemaking
does not automatically deprive that interpretation of the judicial deference
otherwise its due," 159 the Court has cited an agency's "careful consideration" of
a question as a key reason to accord Chevron deference. 160 Moreover, in Mead
itself, the Court indicated: "It is fair to assume generally that Congress
contemplates administrative action with the effect of law [and thus warranting
judicial deference] when it provides for a relatively formal administrative
procedure tending to foster the fairness and deliberation that should underlie a
pronouncement of such force." 161 In sum, despite generally allowing agencies to
resolve ambiguities in the statutes they administer, the Supreme Court has
formulated deference doctrines in a manner that may often encourage greater
agency care and deliberation. 162
A rough analogy supports recognizing a reliance defense here, though again

only if executive constitutional views are reasonable and carry hallmarks of
procedural "fairness and deliberation." In this context, to be sure, the
considerations of relative institutional competence that generally underlie
Chevron doctrine are absent. Courts, not executive agencies, are generally
thought to hold paramount competence over constitutional questions. 163
Furthermore, while Chevron gives priority to agency views in part to protect

policy-driven legal judgments by agencies with presumed competence over
policy, 16 policy-driven resolution of constitutional questions is generally the
antithesis of principled interpretation. 165

(2000) ("Interpretations such as those in opinion letters-like interpretations contained in
policy statements, agency manuals, and enforcement guidelines, all of which lack the force of
law-do not warrant Chevron-style deference.").
159 Barnhart,535 U.S. at 221 (internal citation omitted).
160 Id. at 222.
161 Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 230.
162 Admittedly, by declining to limit Chevron deference to legislative rules and formal
adjudications, Mead leaves the ultimate scope of Chevron deference notoriously unclear. See,
e.g., Lisa Schultz Bressman, How Mead Has Muddled JudicialReview of Agency Action, 58
VAND. L. REV. 1443, 1467 (2005). For present purposes, however, the only relevant point is
Mead's suggestion that greater procedural rigor generally supports greater judicial deference.

163 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 179-80 (1803) (claiming judicial
authority to interpret Constitution).
"6 See, e.g., ADRIAN VERMEULE, LAw's ABNEGATION: FROM LAw's EMPIRE TO THE

ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 29-30 (2016) (characterizing Chevron's ostensible delegation
rationale as legal fiction that in fact "promotes expertise and accountability").
165 But cf Renan, supra note 11, at 812 ("Moral and policy dimensions of legal advice
regularly converge with the deeply technocratic minutiae of complex legal frameworks.").
Relatedly, some argue that the executive branch tends naturally to accrue power, particularly
with respect to national security questions, due to its superior accountability and institutional
competence in resolving legal questions. See, e.g., ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE,
TERROR IN THE BALANCE: SECURITY, LIBERTY, AND THE COURTS 4-6 (2007). While that view

may be a reason to construe executive authority broadly as a matter of first principles, it does
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Even recognizing all these distinctions, however, the federal government's
departmentalist operation does presume at least some executive competence

over constitutional questions, even those affecting the executive branch's own
authority. In addition, justiciability doctrines make it inevitable that the
executive branch will sometimes resolve important constitutional questions on
its own in advance of judicial consideration. Given these realities, Mead's
inference that legal validity is often correlated with procedural rigor seems
equally applicable.1 66 Indeed, when it comes to executive constitutional
interpretation, the same considerations that generally suggest superior judicial
competence over constitutional questions support granting primacy to the Justice
Department over other executive actors. In some sense, OLC, if not the Justice

Department as a whole, is the judicial body of the executive branch: it is the
bureaucratic entity committed institutionally and by reputation to providing
credible legal analysis of constitutional questions.1 67 Within reasonable bounds,
reliance doctrines should therefore encourage seeking OLC guidance over less

deliberative forms of decision-making, much as Mead's refinement of Chevron
may reward greater deliberation in the administrative context.
As for criminal law, perhaps surprisingly, case law addressing the antientrapment defense has converged on roughly analogous principles. As we have
seen, despite recognizing a due process defense when private parties rely on

mistaken government assurances of legality, courts have effectively limited this
defense to circumstances in which those assurances appeared reasonable under
the circumstances.1 68 The Tenth Circuit, for example, recently explained that
"consistent enforcement of the law requires a reasonableness limitation" on any
reliance defense.1 69 In the Tenth Circuit's formulation, reliance must therefore
be "reasonable in light of the identity of the agent [providing legal guidance],
the point of law misrepresented, and the substance of the misrepresentation."1 7 0

In another common formulation, reliance must be "reasonable-in the sense that
a person sincerely desirous of obeying the law would have accepted the

information as true, and would not have been put on notice to make further
'

inquiries." 17

Meanwhile, in cases involving a so-called "public authority" defense-a
claim that the defendant reasonably believed conduct was lawful because he or

not justify allowing executive officials to violate statutory restraints based on unreasonable
constitutional views.
166 See Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 230 (indicating that more stringent administrative
procedure generally supports greater deference).
'7 See supra Section II.B.1 .b.
168 See supra Section H.A.
169 United States v. Rampton, 762 F.3d 1152, 1157 (10th Cir. 2014) (reviewing method of
most consistent law enforcement with respect to entrapment-by-estoppel exception).
70 United States v. Bader, 678 F.3d 858, 886 (10th Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v.
Apperson, 441 F.3d 1162, 1204-05 (10th Cir. 2006)).
171 United States v. Lansing, 424 F.2d 225, 227 (9th Cir. 1970).
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she was aiding law-enforcement efforts1 72-courts
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have generally collapsed the

reasonableness inquiry into a straightforwardjudgment of legality. What matters

in that context is not whether the hapless defendant, having aided, say, an
undercover investigation or counterintelligence operation, reasonably believed
the government had authorized his or her conduct nor even whether government
officials reasonably appeared to hold such authorizing power. What matters is
instead only whether the officials in question had "actual authority" to license
the legal violations. 17 3
As with administrative holdings, these formulations do not cleanly map onto
the particular problem of self-authorizing constitutional interpretation.17 4 On
some level, any reliance on an OLC opinion is "reasonable in light of the identity

of the agent" (here the office designated to provide constitutional guidance) and
"the point of law misrepresented" (here a point of constitutional
interpretation). 7 5 OLC, moreover, typically only answers the questions it is

asked, so officials desirous of following the law have made the "further
inquiries" available to them by requesting and obtaining an OLC opinion in
uncertain areas. 176

Nevertheless, the third consideration in the Tenth Circuit's formulation-the
"substance of the misrepresentation"-remains an essential limitation. 177 A legal
claim that is simply too outlandish or dangerous to be given immunizing force

is unreasonable, not in the sense that the legally untutored would not give it
credence but rather in the more absolute sense that protecting such reliance
would come at too great a cost to the antisuspending principle. It is at least
plausible, furthermore, that limiting legally protected reliance in this way will

induce a desirable sense of caution on the part of those receiving legal guidance.
Again, government officials generally cannot be expected to conduct abstruse

172 See, e.g., United States v. Sariles, 645 F.3d 315, 317 (5th Cir. 2011) (indicating that
"this defense 'is available when the defendant is engaged by a government official to
participate or assist in covert activity"' (quoting United States v. Spires, 79 F.3d 464, 466 n.2

(5th Cir. 1996))); United States v. Fulcher, 250 F.3d 244, 254 (4th Cir. 2001) ("The public
authority defense allows 'the defendant [to] seek[] exoneration based on the fact that he
reasonably relied on the authority of a government official to engage him in a covert activity."'
(alterations in original) (quoting United States v. Baptista-Rodriguez, 17 F.3d 1354, 1368 n.18

(11th Cir. 1994))).

173 See, e.g., United States v. Alvarado, 808 F.3d 474, 484 (11th Cir. 2015) (requiring
government official to actually have authority to issue order to commit crime for which
defendant faces prosecution); Sariles, 645 F.3d at 319 (requiring same); Fulcher, 250 F.3d at
254 (requiring actual authority of government official to engage defendant in covert activity).
One early concurring opinion suggested otherwise, see United States v. Barker, 546 F.2d 940,
955 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (Merhige, J., concurring), but other courts have rejected this view.
'

Cf Note, The Immunity-ConferringPower of the Office of Legal Counsel, 121 HARV.

L. REv. 2086, 2091 (2008) (noting that applying these defenses to immunize officials from
criminal prosecution "raises self-dealing concerns absent from private-party suits").

175 See Bader, 678 F.3d at 886 (quoting Apperson, 441 F.3d at 1204-05).
176 See Lansing, 424 F.2d at 227.

177 See Bader, 678 F.3d at 886.
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legal analysis for themselves, and it is unfair to expect them to do so. 17 8 But at
least with respect to conduct that any citizen of a democracy should appreciate
raises serious civil-liberties

questions, such as torture or wiretapping, a

reasonableness limitation on protected reliance could help stimulate demands
for extra assurance that a legal opinion allowing the conduct is credible.17 9 Such
demands may at least ensure that lawyers' reputations, rather than just the
officials' reputations, will be on the line if the opinion proves mistaken.
In sum, cases from two disparate areas, administrative law and criminal law,
reinforce the view that when government officials rely on a reasonable, signed
OLC or Attorney General opinion to violate an otherwise applicable statute, their
good-faith reliance should afford a defense against later penal sanctions.
3.

Illustrative Applications

The key boundary, then, is reasonableness. What might reasonableness mean
when it comes to constitutional analysis? Without attempting any definitive
answer to the many difficult questions to which this standard might apply, I offer
both some general rules of thumb and a few concrete illustrations.
As to general guidance, a constitutional reasonableness inquiry might
properly focus on the degree of conflict between generally accepted types or
"modalities" of constitutional argument in any given instance. Ongoing debates
over interpretive theory notwithstanding, as a matter of practice American

constitutional analysis is generally a holistic inquiry centered on five basic
modalities of argument-text, structure, history, precedent, and policy-with a

heavy emphasis in most instances on maintaining fidelity to existing judicial
precedents and government practices. 180 Many heated theoretical debates may
be reducible to fights over the correct general ordering of interpretive modalities
(e.g., whether text or original understanding should ever, always, or sometimes
override precedent). By the same token, many hard constitutional questions
involve conflicts between these modalities. Just as a conflict between apparent
legislative purpose and enacted text may present a hard question of statutory

See supra Section I1.B.3.
179 Cf Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Inducing Moral Deliberation: On the Occasional Virtues
78

of Fog, 123 HARv. L. REv. 1214, 1214 (2010) (arguing that imprecise legal standards may
sometimes have "salutary impact . .. on citizens' moral deliberation and on robust democratic
engagement with law"). Some argue that this sense of caution has in fact taken hold within

the intelligence community following the torture controversy. See, e.g.,

GOLDSMITH,

supra

note 8, at 238-40 (discussing indications of CIA "skittishness" following repudiation of
Torture Memos).
180 For a useful account of this "mainstream" approach to constitutional interpretation, see
H. JEFFERSON POWELL, TARGETING AMERICANS: THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE U.S. DRONE

WAR 191-93 (2016). For the canonical account of the basic interpretive modalities of
constitutional law and their relevance, see PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION

11-22 (1991).
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interpretation, so, too, may a conflict between apparent historical understanding
and dictionary meaning present a hard constitutional question.181
From this point of view, a reasonableness standard might compel courts to
defer to an executive opinion's resolution of such a conflict between accepted
modalities, even if the court itself would have resolved the same conflict
differently. In other words, an originalist OLC opinion might be reasonable and
thus support reliance by government officials, even if a court or judge would
have given greater weight to subsequent precedent and practice when
considering the issue de novo. By the same token-and perhaps most
importantly-executive-branch lawyers may act reasonably in resolving
disputed questions based on past executive practice and precedent, even if courts
writing on a blank slate would give greater weight to other considerations. This
last point, indeed, is perhaps departmentalism's central implication: at least
within the limits of textual plausibility and judicial precedent, the executive
branch may develop and adhere to its own principled views on constitutional
meaning. 182
Turning to concrete examples, officials who relied on recent OLC opinions
authorizing them to disregard funding restrictions on participating in certain
United Nations bodies

183

or conducting certain diplomatic activities with China

181 Admittedly, courts applying Chevron deference do not always describe ambiguity as
arising from this sort of conflict. Instead, courts often assert that "[a]t th[e] first step of the
Chevron analysis 'we employ[] traditional tools of statutory construction' to determine
whether Congress has 'unambiguously foreclosed the agency's statutory interpretation."'

Village of Barrington v. Surface Transp. Bd., 636 F.3d 650, 659 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (third
alteration in original) (citation omitted) (first quoting Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def.
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9 (1984); then quoting Catawba County v. EPA, 571 F.3d
20, 35 (D.C. Cir. 2009)). I have elsewhere argued, however, that courts applying the rule of
lenity in the criminal context should focus on whether accepted interpretive criteria render
competing interpretations plausible. See Zachary Price, The Rule of Lenity as a Rule of

Structure, 72 FORDHAM L. REv. 885, 889 (2004).
182 Accounts of how OLC may conduct constitutional interpretation in a principled but
nonetheless distinctive fashion frequently emphasize this feature of executive-branch
constitutionalism. See, e.g., OLC Best Practices Memo, supra note 94, at 2 ("The Office
should not lightly depart from such past decisions, particularly where they directly address
and decide a point in question, but as with any system of precedent, past decisions may be
subject to reconsideration and withdrawal in appropriate cases and through appropriate
processes."); see also BRUFF, supra note 13, at 81 (discussing OLC's reliance on prior
executive-branch opinions); GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY, supra note 93, at 32-39
(discussing OLC's institutional role and "cultural norms"); SHANE, supra note 144, at 103
("However predisposed it may be to upholding plausible assertions of executive power, OLC
is traditionally mindful of its quasi-adjudicative role."). Professor David Luban has identified
the boundary between "legal plausibility" and "frivolity" as key to assessing the ethics of
government legal opinions. See LUBAN, supra note 5, at 229-30. Though similar to the
standard proposed here, the reasonableness standard that I advocate for reliance defenses
should be more constraining than a test of mere plausibility and nonfrivolity.
183 OLC 2009 Appropriations Memo, supra note 24, at
*1.
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through the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy 184 should be
immune from any penal sanctions for violating the ADA.1 85 By the same token,

in an earlier day, officials who relied on Attorney General opinions to disregard
one-house or committee veto provisions in appropriations statutes should have
been immune from such penalties.1 86 All these positions, though perhaps
contestable as a matter of first principles, were nonetheless so firmly rooted in
traditional executive-branch understandings that, in all likelihood, no reasonable
executive-branch lawyer could realistically have advised otherwise.1 87
Though these questions are closer, officials who administered the Obama
Administration's controversial deferred-action immigration programs or
participated in military action against Libya should be equally safe from any

after-the-fact punishment that would otherwise be possible.1 88 In these cases,
too, however controversial OLC's legal conclusions, OLC provided reasoned
opinions rooted in past views that took account of key legal authorities and
articulated cogent limiting principles (in the immigration opinion, even
disapproving one proposal), even as the opinions approved some proposed

actions. Courts reviewing these actions de novo might well reach different
conclusions-indeed, one circuit court did with respect to the immigration
programs.1 89 But when considering a reliance defense to penal sanctions, courts
should view the same question through a different lens.
By contrast, enhanced interrogation in reliance on the Torture Memos offers

an example in which even a formal OLC opinion should not provide blanket
immunity. Insofar as OLC's legal conclusions were deeply flawed-a view

184 Unconstitutional Restrictions on Activities of the Office of Science and Technology
Policy in Section 1340(a) of the Department of Defense and Full-Year Continuing
Appropriations Act, 2011, 35 Op. O.L.C., 2011 WL 4503236, at *1 (Sept. 19, 2011).

185

31 U.S.C. §§ 1341-1342, 1350 (2018).

See, e.g., Constitutionality of Proposed Legislation Affecting Tax Refunds, 37 Op.
Att'y Gen. 56, 61 (1933). For the argument that executive-branch constitutional objections
were justified, see SHANE, supranote 144, at 133-35.
187 Though it is hard to see how it could result in penal sanctions, a recent opinion
concluding that the temporary position of Acting Attorney General was an inferior rather than
principal office under the Appointments Clause appears reasonable given executive-branch
precedent, even if a court might reach a different conclusion de novo. See Designating an
Acting Attorney General, 42 Op. O.L.C., 2018 WL 6131923, at *5 (Nov. 14, 2018) ("[The
Acting Attorney General] was appointed in a manner that satisfies the requirements for an
186

inferior officer.").
188 OLC Immigration Memo, supra note 26, at *1 (authorizing Department of Homeland
Security to implement deferred-action immigration programs); OLC Libya Memo, supra note
25, at *1 ("[W]e concluded that the President had the constitutional authority to direct the use
of force in Libya because he could reasonably determine that such use of force was in the
national interest.").
89

See Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 146 (5th Cir. 2015) (enjoining

implementation of deferred action programs for certain immigrants), aff'd by an equally

divided Court, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016).
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shared by nearly all commentators 190-these
opinions were simply too
unreasonable to support an after-the-fact reliance defense. To the extent that is
true, the reason is not that officials who relied on the opinions could fairly
anticipate being liable; having obtained legal assurances through the proper
channels, they would likely have been in no position to question the lawyers'
conclusions. Nor, on the other hand, is the reason simply that courts on their own
would have reached a different view; any such theory would run roughshod over
departmentalism. The opinions' unreliability instead derives from their sheer
implausibility-from their dependence on a theory of Article II authority
extending beyond even the generally permissive view of executive power
reflected in past executive-branch opinions. 191 Indeed, the extraordinary breadth
of the opinions' reasoning might be a reason to reject reliance upon them even
if a narrower opinion could have justified some practices it covered. 192 To the
extent that reliance doctrine aims in part to encourage sound executive practices,

the quality of an opinion's reasoning rather than the mere fact that it exists may
properly affect the degree of immunity it provides.1 93
By the same token, given limits recognized in the executive branch's own past
opinions and practice, executive-branch lawyers might well exceed the bounds
190

See, e.g., BRUFF, supra note 13, at 239-47 (discussing problems with OLC's legal

analysis);

H. JEFFERSON POWELL, THE PRESIDENT AS COMMANDER IN CHIEF: AN ESSAY IN

CONSTITUTIONAL VISION 38-47 (2014) (same); Richard B. Bilder & Detlev F. Vagts, Speaking
Law to Power: Lawyers and Torture, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 689, 690 (2004) (noting that critics
characterize Torture Memos as "legally and morally unsupportable, likely to endanger our
own military personnel, and damaging to our country's reputation and national interest");
Kathleen Clark, Ethical Issues Raised by the OLC Torture Memorandum, 1 J. NAT'L
SECURITY L. & POL'Y 455, 468-69 (2005) (arguing that authors of Torture Memos violated
ethical obligations of candor and accuracy). But cf GOLDSMITH, supra note 8, at 236 ("The
legality of the original CIA interrogation techniques under the purposefully loophole-ridden
torture law was always a closer question than critics have publicly acknowledged (though
some admit it in private)."). For further discussions of legal issues presented by the torture
controversy, see, for example, BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE AMERICAN
REPUBLIC 107-08 (2010) (detailing criticisms of arguments in Torture Memos as "incomplete
and one-sided" and without legal basis); Morrison, supra note 151, at 1728 (recounting
"widespread condemnation" of Torture Memos by legal academics and commentators); W.
Bradley Wendel, Legal Ethics and the Separation of Law and Morals, 91 CORNELL L. REV.
67, 68 (2005) ("The overwhelming response by experts in criminal, international,
constitutional, and military law was that the legal analysis in the government memos was so
faulty that the lawyers' advice was incompetent.").

191 See, e.g., John C. Dehn, Why a President Cannot Authorize the Military to Violate
(Most of) the Law of War, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV. 813, 820-21 (2018) (explaining that lawof-war statutes bind President); Shane, supra note 13, at 514 ("A competent legal
memorandum on this particular point would consider the implications of constitutional text
pointing conspicuously in the other direction .... ").
192 See GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY, supra note 93, at 144, 148-49 (discussing
Torture Memos' unnecessary breadth).
193

Cf SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 92 (1943) (holding that administrative action

must be upheld on grounds relied on by Agency).
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of reasonableness by approving a full-scale war without advance congressional
approval 194 or authorizing law-enforcement expenditures in defiance of specific
appropriations limitations, like those currently barring federal prosecution of
state-authorized medical marijuana businesses.195 In addition to departing
sharply from existing practice and precedent, such views would likely lack any
adequate foundation in sound textual and historical analysis, thus placing them
beyond the range of reasonable executive interpretation. 196
In sum, applicable due process case law, read in light of the competing
fairness, antisuspending, and departmentalism considerations in this context,
supports recognizing a general reliance defense for government officials facing
penal sanctions for engaging in conduct that OLC or the Attorney General
assured them was lawful in a signed opinion. To maintain an appropriate sense

of caution and restraint on all sides, this defense necessarily must give way when
the constitutional determinations in question are not only wrong but also
unreasonable. Otherwise, in this context considerations of fairness and
bureaucratic regularity should win out over concerns about unprincipled selfauthorization. As we shall see next, however, other contexts implicate a different
balance of concerns and thus require lesser degrees of reliance protection.
Reliance on Other Executive Directives in Penal Litigation

B.

If the balance of relevant considerations, as informed by applicable case law,
generally supports protecting reliance on signed OLC or Attorney General

opinions in subsequent penal litigation, a different calculus should apply to
reliance on less formal legal determinations. Here, too, the reliance calculus
must balance multiple conflicting and largely incommensurate concerns, yet the
overall balance supports weaker reliance protection than in the case of more
9

For my own argument to this effect with respect to the use of force in Korea, see

Zachary Price, Attacking North Korea Would Be Illegal, TAKE CARE BLOG (Aug. 10, 2017),
https://takecareblog.com/blog/attacking-north-korea-would-be-illegal# [https://perma.cc
/SY48-LXDF].
" For my analysis of this point, see Zachary S. Price, Funding Restrictions and
Separation of Powers, 71 VAND. L. REv. 357, 437-49 (2018) (arguing that congressional
appropriations limits may restrict President's authority to enforce laws).
196 As noted earlier, Professor Keith Whittington's theory of the political foundations of
judicial review suggests that presidential challenges to received constitutional understandings
are a hallmark of "reconstructive" presidencies that fundamentally reorient politics going
forward. See WHITTINGTON, supra note 77, at 23. From that point of view, reconstructive
administrations might be prone to adopt positions that appear unreasonable under governing
constitutional understandings. This feature of reconstructive presidencies nevertheless
provides no reason to recognize a legal reliance defense based on such an administration's
assertions. A presidency is reconstructive, on the terms of this theory, only insofar as it
succeeds in reorienting the political and constitutional order. A presidency that tries to do so
and fails should not derive any particular benefit from the attempt. See STEPHEN SKOWRONEK,
THE POLITICS PRESIDENTS MAKE 44-45 (1993) (arguing that Presidents who try to reconstruct
constitutional order and fail are "considered personally deranged and brought down on
charges of gross violations of constitutional stricture").
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formal opinions. For such legal determinations, except insofar as they merely
implement a reasonable prior OLC or Attorney General opinion, reliance should

be protected only to the extent that the executive branch's conclusions were
objectively correct in the reviewing court's view.

The set of legal determinations in this category should include all internal
executive legal conclusions short of authoritative Justice Department guidance,
up to and including presidential signing statements, White House counsel
opinions, and other outputs of the "porous" legal process that some accounts
suggest is growing more common. 197 While such determinations are subject to
the same incentives for overreaching that infect all self-authorizing executive
opinions, they lack the procedural and institutional guarantees that help assure
principled constitutional analysis

in a signed OLC or Attorney General

opinion.1 98 Simply put, there is less reason to trust them and therefore less reason
to protect those who rely on them without making further inquiries. Indeed, on
some level the whole point of a more porous, policy-inflected legal process is to

yield conclusions that give greater relative weight to policy in the legal
calculus. 99 Whatever the merits of that recalibration on other types of legal
questions, there is little reason to let motivated constitutional reasoning of this
sort eliminate statutory restraints on the executive branch itself. In fact, as we
have seen, even in conventional administrative contexts where policy may more
appropriately influence legal analysis, the degree of procedural formality factors

importantly in the degree of judicial deference. 200
On the other hand, departmentalist values may also be at their apex in this
context. In personally issuing a signing statement or selecting some view from

among competing options generated through interagency deliberation,
individual Presidents, as heads of the executive branch, may assert a particular
constitutional view for which they are then politically accountable. From an
accountability perspective, therefore, deference might be more rather than less
warranted in this context.2 0 1
There are nonetheless two fatal problems with giving heightened reliance
protection to such presidential assertions: First, the President, though head of the
197 Renan, supra note 11, at 835-42.
198 Although any significant constitutional assertion in a presidential signing statement is
likely to be vetted internally by the Justice Department, such statements may be formulated
on a rushed timetable and rarely supported by any substantial legal reasoning. In that context,
risks of political manipulation are heightened, as are the incentives to preserve an executive
position by laying down a marker, even if the position is dubious and on closer examination
would provide no sound basis for departing from statutory requirements.
199 See Renan, supra note 11, at 872 ("Within a 'zone' of reasonable legal answers is a
policy-drenched process of giving law meaning."); see also Bauer, supra note 11, at 250
(advocating approach to national security crises that allows for "full exploration of the legal
grounds for action while allowing for all the relevant policy, moral, and other reasons, for or
against the policy, to be identified and integrated into the legal deliberative process").
200 See supra Section III.A.2.
20! Cf Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARv. L. REV. 2245, 2310-11
(2001) (advocating judicial deference based on presidential accountability).
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executive branch, is not personally vested with the relevant legal authorities. As
noted earlier, the Attorney General instead holds statutory authority, now
delegated by regulation to the Assistant Attorney General for OLC, to provide
legal guidance to the executive branch; the Justice Department also holds
202
For all but the
exclusive statutory authority to enforce most criminal laws.

most ardent proponents of a unitary executive branch, Congress properly holds
power under the Appointments Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause to
assign particular responsibilities to particular executive officers in this way,
203
From that point of
subject of course to appropriate presidential supervision.

view, statutory assignment of responsibility for legal interpretation should
support giving greater weight to these officers' opinions.
Second, and relatedly, giving primacy to OLC (or at least the Justice
Department as a whole) strikes a better balance among the relevant competing

considerations. Insofar as the core value departmentalism protects is not
presidential judgment for its own sake but rather principled executive judgment

on constitutional issues, departmentalism values are better advanced by
encouraging a legal process that gives greater force to legal values than to

political ones. As for fairness considerations, punishing an individual for
conduct undertaken in reliance on the President's own assurances or directives
certainly risks significant unfairness. Nevertheless, the absence of any formal
legal opinion cuts against treating the risks of entrapment here as equivalent to
2
reliance on an OLC or Attorney General opinion. 04 Again, some anti-

entrapment case law treats whether "a person sincerely desirous of obeying the
law would have accepted the information as true, and would not have been put
205
as a prerequisite to recognizing a reliance
on notice to make further inquiries"

defense. Here, the same consideration should foreclose protecting reliance if
those at the top of an agency could have done more to protect themselves and
their staff.
Here, then, the balance of relevant considerations should support weaker
reliance protection. Even so, the institutional setting, and in particular the
unfairness of punishing officials for relying on presidential directives, should
once again inform how courts evaluate the legal determination in question on
the merits. In particular, insofar as the doctrine should aim to encourage

202 See supra Section II.B.1.b.
203 See Peter L. Strauss, Overseer, or "The Decider"? The President in Administrative
Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 696, 705 (2007) ("If differing views of presidential authority
were occasionally expressed, both important events and implicit understandings of our first
two centuries appeared to settle on a construction of President as overseer and not decider in
relation to ordinary administration."). See generally Michael W. McConnell, The President
Who Would Not Be King (Jan. 21, 2019) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author)
(arguing that Congress may vest law enforcement authorities in subordinate officers subject
to presidential removal).
204 Cf United States v. Lansing, 424 F.2d 225, 227 (9th Cir. 1970) (indicating that reliance
defense depends on whether "further inquiries" would reasonably have been pursued).
205 See id.; see also United States v. Batteree, 361 F.3d 1210, 1216-17 (9th Cir. 2004)
(quoting Lansing's definition of reasonable reliance).
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obtaining a credible executive-branch opinion, courts should not necessarily
reject a reliance defense simply because they would have reached a different
legal conclusion de novo. Instead, the relevant tradeoffs may best cash out in a
rule that (a) protects reliance on executive directives insofar as they follow
inevitably from reasonable prior OLC or Attorney General opinions but
(b) otherwise gives the executive view no particular deference.
Under this approach, directives and assertions based on longstanding
executive-branch understandings, such as the view that conduct of diplomacy is
an exclusive executive prerogative, could immunize officials who rely on such
directives from subsequent penal sanctions. To establish such protection, the
executive branch would not need to reinvent the wheel by restating in new
formal opinions a view already established by a prior line of reasoned executive
precedent-even if courts might not share the asserted view as a matter of first
principles. At the same time, however, more novel assertions in a signing

statement or other informal directive could not have such immunizing effect.
Thus, for example, even were this position capable of some reasonable defense
in an OLC opinion, President Trump's recent signing statement questioning the

validity of funding restrictions on federal marijuana enforcement could not
properly be subject to reliance by subordinate officials. 206 By the same token,
while use of military force within the parameters of prior executive-branch legal
opinions may be immune from sanctions under the ADA or other applicable
statutes, use of military force outside those parameters should not carry the same
protection absent a credible new opinion.
By thus calibrating the level of deference in accordance with the level of
seriousness reflected in executive-branch reasoning, courts could encourage
formulation of novel positions in the institutional setting most likely to result in
a principled rather than strategic interpretation. In the administrative context,

once again, Mead and related cases effectively encourage more deliberative
agency processes by making judicial deference more likely when the agency
proceeds based on "careful consideration." 207 By the same token, here,
calibrating the level of reliance protection could encourage officials to seek more

complete legal guidance in the first place, an outcome likely to benefit overall
legal compliance within the executive branch. This result, moreover, gives
appropriate force to departmentalist values, at least insofar as departmentalism
is understood to support principled presidential constitutionalism rather than

unprincipled self-licensing. Under the view advocated here, presidents may
effectively shield subordinates from penal sanction but only insofar as their
constitutional assertions accord with the broader tradition of American
constitutionalism reflected in past executive-branch opinions. Advice from
executive-branch lawyers-lawyers who are themselves accountable to the

206 See Price, supra note 195, at 448 (arguing that President Trump's signing statement
denying Congress's authority to restrict marijuana enforcement was "mistaken").
207 Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 222 (2002) (holding that "careful consideration the
Agency has given the question over a long period of time" supported concluding that
"Chevron provides the appropriate legal lens through which to view the legality of the Agency
interpretation here at issue"); see also supra Section III.A.2.
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President but depended upon for sound professional judgment-may push past
existing precedent to a somewhat greater degree, but they may only do so
because lawyers formulate advice in an institutional setting in which
professional norms and internal practices may be more conducive to principled
legal reasoning.

This understanding still risks significant unfairness to subordinate
government officials. But it calibrates the level of deference to the heightened
risks of unprincipled self-authorization in this institutional setting, and it
responds to those risks by maintaining incentives to seek more formal legal
guidance from the governmental agency with particular legal competence when
the position the President advances appears novel and uncertain. In short, this

understanding adapts existing due process case law to the background structural
and normative concerns that apply in this particular institutional setting.
C.

An Aside on Statutory Construction

Before turning to a last litigation setting-other types of lawsuits such as civil
interpretation, as opposed to constitutional
damages suits-statutory

interpretation, warrants a brief detour. Although I focus here on executive
constitutional interpretation, OLC, the Attorney General, and other executive
officials routinely engage in statutory construction too. Indeed, key opinions,

including those addressing such controversial matters as enhanced interrogation
and drone strikes, often address both statutory questions and constitutional
questions. In some instances, they may also reach statutory conclusions
informed by constitutional

understandings

or even

calculated to

avoid

constitutional questions. A clean separation between constitutional and statutory
interpretation is thus impossible, and in any event, opinions interpreting
governing statutes may present many of the same fairness concerns that result
from executive opinions deeming statutes unconstitutional.
Should reliance on an executive statutory interpretation, then, immunize

executive officials from subsequent penal sanctions? Although this question
raises some unique concerns, many of the same considerations sketched so far
could support recognizing a parallel set of reliance defenses. For one thing, the
Justice Department's statutory authorities with respect to legal interpretation and
criminal enforcement provide, equivalent reasons to give primacy to OLC's or

the Attorney General's views over those of other executive actors, including the
President, when it comes to the effective scope of penal prohibitions. 208 Here,

too, by the same token, there are equivalent benefits to rewarding agencies that
seek guidance with greater legal protection, and fairness concerns once again
support protecting those who seek legal assurances from the bait-and-switch of
prosecuting them after the fact.
Of course, this framework implicates the same paradoxical relationship
between reliance and immunity that runs through this Article-that recognizing
immunizing power encourages agencies to seek advice while simultaneously

heightening the incentives to corrupt the advice given. Here, however, no less

208 See supra Section II.B.

1.b.
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than with respect to constitutional interpretation, the best balance available may
be to protect reliance only insofar as the advice is objectively reasonable, thus
preserving a backstop against gravely flawed advice. By the same token,
withdrawing all deference if OLC loses the institutional attributes that give its
opinions particular credibility may provide a further and still more important

backstop.
On the other hand, OLC does not have any particular policy competence of
the sort that justifies administrative deference on expertise and accountability
grounds; OLC's special competence, such as it is, relates to court-like legalistic
interpretation. 209 But this distinction goes more to the nature of OLC
reasonableness in statutory construction than to the appropriate standard for a
reliance defense. Although OLC might well lack competence to render an
immunizing opinion deeming particular conduct lawful based on a policyinflected statutory interpretation, OLC can competently analyze the statutory

text and history in ways a court would. Once OLC or the Attorney General has
done so credibly and reasonably, much the same balance of concerns addressed
earlier with respect to constitutional interpretation may justify privileging the

offending

official's reliance

over a court's preference

for a different

210

interpretation.
It is also worth noting that any OLC interpretation implicating these principles

is likely to involve a narrow rather than broad construction of the applicable
statute. Under the so-called rule of lenity, for reasons I have addressed
elsewhere, courts should generally favor narrow, defendant-friendly
interpretations of criminal statutes. 211 Doing so helps ensure democratic
accountability for criminal prohibitions and counteracts political incentives for
overcriminalization. 2 12 To be sure, laws limiting executive authority might be
expected to encounter greater political resistance than ordinary criminal laws

given the executive branch's interest in avoiding such restraints. By the same
token, however, Congress may have some incentive to score political points by
criminalizing conduct that it expects the executive branch will not in fact
punish. 213 To the extent that applying the usual rule of lenity is justified in this
setting-a question I do not attempt to resolve here-the resulting preference

209 See, e.g., VERMEULE, supra note 164, at 30 (associating judicial deference to agency
interpretations with rationales of superior expertise and accountability over policy).

210 See supra Section I.A.
211 Price, supra note 181, at 925.
212 Id. ("[T]he rule of lenity is important because it at least facilitates democratic
accountability in circumstances where political constraints would otherwise be weak."); see
also Kiel Brennan-Marquez, Essay, Extremely BroadLaws, 61 ARIz. L. REv. 641, 658 (2019)
(describing political incentives for legislatures to enact broad criminal laws).
211 Price, supra note 181, at 911 (explaining "tough on crime" electorate pressures
legislators to expand reach of criminal law and rely on prosecutors to exercise discretion with
minor offenses); cf POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 165, at 3 (observing that legislatures
often impose restrictions on executive conduct after the fact despite approving of executive
responses during emergencies).
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for narrow interpretations may shorten any gap between de novo executive and
judicial readings of criminal statutes.
Although it predated the modern reliance case law and employed a different
analytic framework, one key historic case in fact drew more or less this same
limit on reliance. In United States v. Dietrich,214 a federal circuit court held in
1904 that a U.S. senator's contract with the federal government violated an
applicable statute despite an earlier Attorney General opinion approving a
similar contract. 215 "The construction of a doubtful or ambiguous statute by the
Attorney General in the discharge of his duty to render opinions upon questions

of law arising in the administration of any of the executive departments," the
court held, "is always entitled to respectful consideration, and where that
construction is acted upon for a long time by those charged with the duty of
executing the statute it ought not to be overruled without cogent reasons." 216
Nevertheless, the court found the opinion in question patently unpersuasive.
"We cannot follow or approve the opinion cited," the judges explained, 217

because
[i]t does not refer to the terms of the statute; the reasons assigned for the
conclusion stated are brief and unsatisfactory; it is not shown that this
opinion has been followed in any of the executive departments for any
length of time, or at all; and we think the statute is ... plain and
unambiguous. 218
By requiring "cogent reasons" to disregard a prior Attorney General opinion,
Dietrich suggests, at least obliquely, that an executive-branch legal opinion may
sometimes be subject to reliance even if a court addressing the question in the
first instance would have given less weight to past executive practice and

precedent and thus reached some different conclusion. Nevertheless, Dietrich's
ultimate rejection of the Attorney General's view suggests that if an executivebranch opinion is unreasonable even by such deferential standards, it cannot
exempt those who rely on it from subsequent penal remedies. Dietrich thus

indirectly supports the framework advocated here for both constitutional and
statutory executive-branch opinions.
Civil Damages Suits and Other Litigation

D.

Some reliance protection, then, is warranted in after-the-fact punitive

enforcement suits, although the scope and character of such protection should
vary according to the nature of the legal assurances at issue. It remains to
consider other potential forms of litigation, particularly civil damages suits
against government officers and enforcement actions against private parties. In

these types of suits, the balance of relevant considerations should tip the other
way, so as to support de novo judicial consideration of pertinent constitutional

214 126 F. 671 (C.C.D. Neb. 1904).
215 Id. at 676.
216

Id.

217 Id.
218

Id.
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questions. In such litigation, in other words, prior executive-branch legal

determinations, whether embodied in formal legal opinions or not, should not
establish any special reliance defense.
A distinguishing feature of both of these forms of litigation is that the rights
of private parties

may depend

on the

court rejecting

executive

legal

interpretations on which government officials relied. To start with the easiest
case, when the government enforces the law against a private party in reliance
on an executive opinion or statement deeming unconstitutional any restrictions
on such enforcement (such as, say, an appropriations limitation), upholding

reliance on the government's own prior constitutional conclusions would
obviously mean shortchanging the current defendant's interest in a different
view prevailing. 219 Much the same is true in a tort damages action seeking

retrospective liability against the government or an individual officer based on
unlawful official action. In such suits, the claim's viability might well depend
on the claimant's view of the underlying constitutional law prevailing over the
view on which the government relied.
Accordingly, in either type of suit, officials' reliance on past internal

executive-branch guidance provides no compelling reason to depart from
conclusions the court would have reached on its own. Precisely because private
interests apart from the government's relationship with its own personnel are at
issue, departmentalism requires giving independent force to judicial judgments

about the proper redress of private harms. Likewise, antisuspending concerns
strongly support an independent judicial role here: leaving affected private
parties without redress (or without an otherwise-available defense) would
eliminate even indirect restraints on the executive branch's self-dealing
determination of its own powers.

To be sure, damages claims against individual officers (if not also other types
of litigation) may raise significant fairness concerns-concerns that have shaped
the doctrine of qualified immunity. But such concerns are nowhere near as acute
as in enforcement suits seeking criminal liability or other punitive action. In all

likelihood, the government will indemnify individual officers for any personal
liability, 220 and while such potential indemnity may not spare officials the
burdens and reputational costs of a lawsuit or adverse judgment, 221 it may at
least mitigate fairness concerns about holding them to account.

219 Cf United States v. McIntosh, 833 F.3d 1163, 1178-79 (9th Cir. 2016) (applying
appropriations restriction on federal marijuana enforcement to bar prosecutions).
220 See Joanna C. Schwartz, Police Indemnfication, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 885, 890 (2014)
(concluding from empirical survey that "[p]olice officers are virtually always indemnified").
221 See Joanna C. Schwartz, How Qualified Immunity Fails, 127 YALE L.J. 2, 9 (2017)
(noting that Supreme Court cases on qualified immunity have increasingly focused on "the
need to protect government officials from nonfinancial burdens associated with discovery and
trial").
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Furthermore, although some case law suggests that qualified immunity's
purpose is to ensure fair warning to the individual officer, 222 the doctrine seems
better understood, along the lines of administrative law deference doctrines, as
protecting officials' freedom of action within objectively reasonable bounds. 223
Reflecting this tension in qualified immunity's rationale, lower courts are split
over whether and to what degree reliance on an internal legal opinion should
guarantee immunity to frontline officers. 224 Whatever the merits of the proimmunity position in other contexts, here the cost to competing departmentalist

and antisuspending values is simply too great to provide blanket immunity for
reliance on self-authorizing executive legal judgments.
It is true that civil damages suits against federal officers may become less
common even without any broad reliance defense. Historically, as Professor
James Pfander has demonstrated, damages litigation was a primary vehicle for

elaborating and enforcing legal restraints on the executive branch, 225 and in its

222 See, e.g., Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1152 (2018) (per curiam) ("[T]he focus
[in assessing a qualified immunity claim] is on whether the officer had fair notice that her
conduct was unlawful .... " (quoting Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198 (2004) (per

curiam))); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 557 (1967) (recognizing "defense of good faith and
probable cause" in § 1983 suit).
223 See Baude, supra note 41, at 60-61 ("[I]nstead of the subjective inquiry into intent or
motive that marked the good-faith inquiry, qualified immunity has become an objective
standard based on case law. This means that even the official who acts in badfaith is entitled
to the defense if a different official could have reasonably made the mistake." (footnote
omitted)).
224 Compare In re County of Erie, 546 F.3d 222, 229 (2d Cir. 2008) (refusing to consider
"reliance upon advice of counsel" in immunity defense), with Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle,

622 F.3d 248, 255-56 (3d Cir. 2010) (holding that "a police officer who relies in good faith
on a prosecutor's legal opinion that the arrest is warranted under the law is presumptively
entitled to qualified immunity from Fourth Amendment claims premised on a lack of probable
cause"), and Cox v. Hainey, 391 F.3d 25, 35 (1st Cir. 2004) (deeming advice of counsel
relevant to immunity calculus unless "an objectively reasonable officer would have [had]
cause to believe that the prosecutor's advice was flawed, off point, or otherwise
untrustworthy"). The Supreme Court suggested in dicta that reliance on advice of counsel
may be relevant to qualified immunity in some circumstances. See Messerschmidt v.
Millender, 565 U.S. 535, 553 (2012) ("[T]he fact that the officers sought and obtained
approval of the warrant application from a superior and a deputy district attorney before
submitting it to the Magistrate provides further support for the conclusion that an officer could
reasonably have believed that the scope of the warrant was supported by probable cause.").
For a general survey of courts' varied approaches, see Dawson, supra note 40, at 528-29, 543-

53.
225 See JAMES E. PFANDER, CONSTITUTIONAL TORTS AND THE WAR ON TERROR

6 (2017)

("After independence, the courts of the United States regularly relied on common-law suits
against responsible officials as the cornerstone of government accountability."); see also
JERRY L. MASHAW, CREATING THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTION 6 (2012) (observing that,

in the early decades of the American Republic, "[c]ommon law actions had the capacity to
provide substantial relief with respect to the activities of the most numerous federal agents:

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

248

[Vol. 100:197

landmark 1971 decision in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal

Bureau of Narcotics,226the Supreme Court recognized a tort cause of action for
certain constitutional violations. 227 In subsequent decisions culminating in
Ziglar v. Abbasi,228 however, the Court has all but disclaimed any such cause of
action, concluding that, in general, "the Legislature is in [a] better position [than
courts] to consider if 'the public interest would be served' by imposing a 'new
substantive legal liability."' 229 To the extent Ziglar precludes liability for
constitutional tort damages apart from unlawful searches, the analysis offered
here might provide yet another reason to reconsider the Court's holding. The

Court in Ziglar, after all, based its holding in part on concerns that "high officers
who face personal liability for damages might refrain from taking urgent and
lawful action in a time of crisis." 230 Giving such overwhelming primacy to
reliance concerns in this context, however, would require shortchanging other
competing principles identified earlier as central to the analysis.
In any event, to the extent liability otherwise remains possible, the balance of
relevant

principles

militates against recognizing an automatic

qualified-

immunity defense based on executive legal assurances. Though some have
argued to the contrary, 231 any such absolute defense would go beyond what
sound analysis justifies even in the penal enforcement context, let alone with
respect to civil liability. Here, moreover, because offsetting departmentalist and
antisuspending considerations are so powerful, fairness cannot provide the
exclusive basis for analysis, particularly when fairness considerations do support

recognizing a reliance defense with respect to penal litigation. 232 To the extent
reliance defenses sometimes preclude penal prosecution (as I argued earlier they
should), some alternative mechanism of after-the-fact legal accountability may
be important to disciplining executive constitutional analysis. As Pfander
(among others) has argued, the "imperfection" of internal constraints on lawless
government action, as evidenced most notably in the torture controversy,

tax collectors and postal officials" and that "[o]fficial immunity was nonexistent; the officers'
only defense was that they were carrying out their statutory responsibilities").
226

403 U.S. 388 (1971).

Id. at 397 ("[W]e hold that petitioner is entitled to recover money damages for any
injuries he has suffered as a result of the agents' violation of the [Fourth] Amendment.").
227

137 S. Ct. 1843 (2017).
Id. at 1857 (quoting Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 426-27 (1988)).
230 See id. at 1863.
228

229

231 See Dawson, supra note 40, at 528 (positing that "legal advice should support an
officer's qualified immunity defense when the officer can show that an objectively reasonable
officer would have relied on the lawyer's advice to conclude that her intended conduct would
not violate clearly established constitutional law"); Pines, supranote 7, at 98 (arguing that "it
is appropriate, as well as beneficial to American society, for government employees to be
shielded from civil liability and criminal prosecution for actions undertaken in reliance on an
Attorney General opinion").
232 See supra Section III.A.
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"suggests a continuing need for some form of external judicial test of the legality
of government action." 233
As for government enforcement actions against private parties, courts have

had little trouble disregarding OLC or Attorney General opinions in that context.
In the 1939 case Perkins v. Elg,234 the Supreme Court upheld a decree blocking

a deportation the Court considered unlawful, even though doing so meant
disagreeing with an Attorney General opinion on which the labor secretary
relied. 235 Noting that the Attorney General had disregarded past practice and
failed to consider key features of birthright citizenship under the Fourteenth
Amendment, the Court held that, although it was "reluctant to disagree with the
opinion of the Attorney General," in this case "the conclusions of that opinion
[were] not adequately supported and [were] opposed to the established principles
which should govern the disposition of the case." 236 Likewise, more recently, in
Laurel Baye Healthcare of Lake Lanier, Inc. v. NLRB, 237 the D.C. Circuit

vacated an order issued by just two members of the NLRB, notwithstanding a
prior OLC opinion concluding that two members were sufficient for a
quorum. 238
By the same logic, to consider a current example, President Trump's signing

statement should have no bearing on whether courts enforce appropriations
limits on federal marijuana enforcement. During the Obama Administration, the
federal government pursued penal remedies against certain marijuana offenders
despite claims that their conduct complied with state law and thus fell within the
applicable appropriations restriction. 239 Although the government argued that
this appropriations ban applied only in narrower circumstances, the Ninth

Circuit rejected that reading and barred continued litigation against the
defendants. 240 In the meantime, President Trump issued his signing statement,
233 PFANDER, supra note 225, at 97.
234 307 U.S. 325 (1939).
236

See id. at 347.
Id. at 348-49.

237

564 F.3d 469 (D.C. Cir. 2009).

235

238 Id. at 476 (disagreeing with OLC opinion that two members constituted quorum despite
concluding that question was "close" and that OLC opinion was not "entirely indefensible");
see also NLRB v. Noel Canning, 573 U.S. 513, 550 (2014) (disagreeing with OLC opinion
regarding recess appointment).
239 See Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-113, § 542, 129 Stat.
2242, 2332-33 (2015) (barring use of Justice Department funds "to prevent [certain listed
states] from implementing their own laws that authorize the use, distribution, possession, or
cultivation of medical marijuana"); see also Continuing Appropriations Act, 2016, Pub. L.
No. 114-53, § 103, 129 Stat. 502, 506 (2015) (extending force of § 538 with respect to
continuing appropriations); Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015,
Pub. L. No. 113-235, § 538, 128 Stat. 2130, 2217 (2014) (including restriction similar to

§ 542).
240

United States v. McIntosh, 833 F.3d 1163, 1178-79 (9th Cir. 2016) ("DOJ is currently

prohibited from spending funds from specific appropriations acts for prosecutions of those
who complied with state [medical marijuana] law.").
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raising doubts about whether Congress holds authority to deny funds for
executive enforcement of substantive federal laws. 241 Had prosecutors relied on
any such presidential view, its existence-or even its formulation in a formal
executive legal opinion-would have provided no reason for the court to reach
a different result. The primacy of antisuspending concerns over any valid
reliance consideration in this context justifies disregarding the executive
branch's views and considering the question de novo, just as courts have
regularly done. 242

In sum, recognizing a limited reliance defense in penal litigation against
government officials highlights the value in maintaining external de novo
consideration of constitutional questions in other litigation contexts, particularly
suits seeking private damages from individual government officials. Congress
may adjust such liabilities or provide indemnities as appropriate, but such suits

may provide an important mechanism for external judicial consideration of
potentially self-serving interpretations of Article II developed within the
executive branch itself.
CONCLUSION

As public opinion grows increasingly divided, executive-branch lawyers'
capacity for objective legal analysis is coming under increasing stress. One

consequence may be that a question we have largely avoided answering to
date-the degree to which official legal opinions may immunize those who rely
on them-will now require judicial resolution. To guide any such future

decisions, I have attempted in this Article to identify the set of reliance doctrines
best

supported

by governing

authorities

and background

constitutional

considerations. Reliance on authoritative OLC or Attorney General legal
opinions, I have argued, should generally afford a defense to penal prosecution;
reliance on less formal legal directives should provide such a defense only
insofar as the directive followed ineluctably from reasonable past executive
opinions; and reliance should provide no particular defense in other litigation
settings such as third-party prosecutions and civil damages suits.
Elaborating these principles carries some risk of inviting bad-faith invocation
of reliance. Yet my goal is the opposite. Throughout this Article, I have aimed

to highlight how reliance doctrines may help reinforce other mechanisms of
legal restraint, such as formulation of principled legal guidance within the
federal executive branch. The judiciary is the most important rule-of-law
institution in our society, but it is hardly the only one, and political division may
strain courts' capacity to resolve legal questions in a manner perceived by all as
legitimate. In crafting reliance doctrines, courts should therefore consider not
only their own best view of the law but also whether deferring to others' views
241 See Trump 2017 Appropriations Act Signing Statement, supra note 31, at 1-2
("[S]ection 537 provides that the Department of Justice may not use any funds to prevent
implementation of medical marijuana laws by various States and territories. I will treat this
provision consistently with my constitutional responsibility to take care that the laws be
faithfully executed.").
242

See, e.g., Noel Canning, 573 U.S. at 550; Perkins v. Elg, 307 U.S. 325, 348-49 (1939).
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may sometimes better preserve an ethic of legal compliance within the executive
branch, the branch of government where the rule of law most matters and yet
may be most imperiled.
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